Search Results

Results for Debt Contracts:

Nittai Bergman

Nittai Bergman

Nanyang Technological University Professor

Department: Associate Professor of Finance

Contact: (617) 253-2933, nbergman@mit.edu

Expertise: Banking; Bankruptcy; Capital budgeting; Corporate finance; Liquidity

Bengt Holmstrom

Bengt Holmstrom

Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics

Contact: (617) 253-0506, bengt@mit.edu

Expertise: Alliances; Apple; Apple; Applied economics; Applied microeconomics; Bank capital; Banking; Business school; Capital market; Capital markets; Central banks; CEO compensation; CEO compensation; Compensation; Compensation; Competition; Competitive strategy; Contagion; Contracting; Corporate diversification; Corporate finance; Corporate governance; Corporate governance; Corporate governance; Corporate governance; Corporate governance; Corporate incentives; Debt; Debt ceiling; Debt contracts; Decision analysis; Deflation; Earnings manipulation; Economics; Economy; Education; Entrepreneurial finance; Entrepreneurship; Equities; Euro; European Union (EU); Eurozone; Executive compensation; Executive compensation; Executive pay; Family business; Federal Reserve; Finance; Financial markets; Financial regulation; Financial reporting; Future of work; Game theory; Global economics; Globalization; Great Recession; Hi-technology / Hi-tech; Incentives; Incubators; Information technology; Innovation; Investment analysis; Leadership; Liquidity; Managerial economics; Managerial economics; Managerial vision; Microeconomics; Microeconomics; Monetary policy; Motivation; Motivation; Organizational design and performance; Organizational studies; Organizations; Outsourcing; Performance measurement systems; Scandinavia; Securitization; Signaling; Smartphones; Stock market; Stock options; Strategy; Technological innovation; United States; Venture capital; Venture capital; Wireless communication

Andrew Sutherland

Andrew Sutherland

Department: Assistant Professor of Accounting

Contact: (617) 324-3894, AGS1@MIT.EDU

Expertise: Accounting standards; Auditing; Bank regulation; Banking; Banking industry; Banking regulation; Bankruptcy; Bankruptcy; Contracting; Corporate diversification; Corporate finance; Debt; Debt contracts; Economic crisis; Entrepreneurial finance; Entrepreneurial finance; Entrepreneurial management; Entrepreneurship; Financial institutions; Financial regulation; Financial reporting; Financial reporting; Microeconomics; Regulation and policy; Regulatory bodies; Reporting; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

Ross Watts

Ross Watts

Department: Professor of Accounting, Emeritus

Contact: (617) 253-2668, rwatts@mit.edu

Expertise: Accounting; Accounting standards; Activity Based Management (ABM); Asia Pacific; Auditing; Canada; Capital budgeting; Contracting; Corporate disclosure practices; Corporate finance; Corporate governance; Corporate governance; Corporate governance; Debt contracts; Dividend policy; Earnings management; Earnings manipulation; Financial reporting; Financial statement analysis; Hong Kong; Management control; Managerial accounting; New Zealand; Statement analysis; Taiwan; United Kingdom; United States

Joseph Weber

Joseph Weber

George Maverick Bunker Professor of Management

Department: Professor of Accounting

Contact: (617) 253-4310, jpweber@mit.edu

Expertise: Accounting; Auditing; Corporate governance; Disclosure; Earnings management; Earnings manipulation; International tax; Tax policy

Credible financial statements help firms raise financing and increase investment — Nemit Shroff

From Columbia Law School Blue Sky Blog One of the primary purposes of financial statements is to facilitate the exchange of capital between investors and companies. The extent to which investors rely on the information reported in financial statements depends on the credibility of those financial statements – that is, the trust or faith investors have in the financial statements presented to them. Typically, companies establish the credibility of their financial statements by having an independent auditor verify the accuracy of those disclosures. However, the effect of auditing on financial statement credibility depends on the independence of the auditor and the rigor with which the audit is performed. An increase in reporting credibility can increase the degree to which investors rely on financial statement information for both writing debt (and other) contracts that govern the terms under which capital is exchanged and informing investors about companies’ operations and performance. As … Read More »The post Credible financial statements help firms raise financing and increase investment — Nemit Shroff appeared first on MIT Sloan Experts.

Your Recent Searches

Can't find what
you're looking for?

Contact us.

Twitter

Paul Denning
Director of Media
Relations
617.253.0576
denning@mit.edu

Patricia Favreau
Associate Director of
Media Relations
617.253.3492
pfavreau@mit.edu

©2010 MIT Sloan School of Management