Michael Whinston

Sloan Fellows Professor of Management
Professor of Economics and Management
MIT Sloan Applied Economics Group and 
MIT Department of Economics

Biography | Selected Publications

“Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection vs. Reclassification Risk,” Whinston, M., with B. Handel and I. Hendel, forthcoming in Econometrica.

“The Efficiency of Bargaining Under Divided Entitlements,” Whinston, M., with I. Segal. University of Chicago Law Review (81), Winter 2014, 273-89.

“Merger Policy with Merger Choice,” Volker Nocke and Michael D. Whinston. American Economic Review (103), April 2013, 1006-33.

“Does Retailer Power Lead to Exclusion?,” P. Rey and M. Whinston. RAND Journal of Economics (44), Spring 2013. 75-81.

“Property Rights,” Whinston, M., with I. Segal. Chapter 3 in R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds., Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, 2013.

"Comment on Carl Shapiro’s 'Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye,'” in J. Lerner and S. Stern, eds., The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited, NBER Conference Report, University of Chicago Press, 2012.

“A Simple Status Quo that Ensures Participation (with Application to Efficient Bargaining),” Ilya R. Segal, Michael D. Whinston. Theoretical Economics (6), January 2011, 109-25.

“Dynamic Merger Review,” Volker Nocke and Michael D. Whinston. Journal of Political Economy (118), December 2010, 1200-51.

“Taking the Dogma Out of Econometrics: Structural Modeling and Credible Inference,” Whinston, M., with A. Nevo, Journal of Economic Perspectives, (24), Spring 2010, 69-82.

Microeconomics, Whinston, M., with B.D. Bernheim. McGraw-Hill, 2008, 833 pp.; Second Edition published 2013, 818 pp.

“Antitrust in Innovative Industries,” Whinston, M., with I. Segal. American Economic Review (97), December 2007, 1703-30 (awarded 2008 Compass Lexecon Prize).

“Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers,” Whinston, M., in M. Armstrong and R. Porter, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.

“Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey,” Whinston, M. European Competition Law Review, 2007, 323-32.

Lectures on Antitrust Economics, Whinston, M. MIT Press, 2006, 249 pp.

“Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities,” Whinston, M., with I. Segal. Econometrica (71), May 2003, 757-91.

“On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration,” Whinston, M. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (19), April 2003, 1-23.

“The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk-Sharing),” Whinston, M., with I. Segal. Econometrica (70), January 2002, 1-45.

“Assessing the Property Rights and Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope,” Whinston, M. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings (91), May 2001, 184-88.

“Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know and Don’t Know,” Whinston, M. Journal of Economic Perspectives (15), Spring 2001, 63-80.

“Naked Exclusion: Comment,” Whinston, M., with I. Segal. American Economic Review (90), March 2000, 296-309.

“Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments,” Whinston, M., with I. Segal. RAND Journal of Economics (31), Winter 2000, 603-33.

“Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity,” Whinston, M., with B.D. Bernheim. American Economic Review (88), September 1998, 902-32.

“Exclusive Dealing,” Journal of Political Economy (106), February 1998, 64-103.

Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995, 981 pp. (with A. Mas-Colell and J. Green)

“On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation,” RAND Journal of Economics (26), Summer 1995, pp. 180-202.

“Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance,” Whinston, M., with P. Bolton. Review of Economics Studies (60), January 1993, pp. 121-48.

“Entry and Competitive Structure in Deregulated Airline Markets: An Event Study Analysis of People Express," Whinston, M., with S. Collins. RAND Journal of Economics (23), Winter 1993, 445-62.

“The ‘Foreclosure’ Effects of Vertical Mergers,” Whinston, M., with P. Bolton. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (147), March 1991, pp. 207-26.

“Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry: An Exploratory Analysis,” Whinston, M., with R. Caves and M. Hurwitz. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics, 1991, pp. 1-48.

“Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,” Whinston, M. American Economic Review (80), September 1990, pp. 837-59.

“Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior,” Whinston, M., with B.D. Bernheim. RAND Journal of Economics (21), Spring 1990, pp. 1-26.

“Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values,” Whinston, M., with R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Quarterly Journal of Economics (104), May 1989, pp. 371-84.

“Exit with Multiplant Firms,” RAND Journal of Economics (19), Winter 1988, pp. 568-88.

“Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I: Concepts,” Whinston, M., with B.D. Bernheim and B. Peleg. Journal of Economic Theory (42), June 1987, pp. 1-12

“Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II: Applications,” Whinston, M., with B.D. Bernheim. Journal of Economic Theory (42), June 1987, pp. 13-29.

“Common Agency,” Whinston, M., with B.D. Bernheim. Econometrica (54), July 1986, pp. 923-42

“Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence,”Whinston, M., with B.D. Bernheim. Quarterly Journal of Economics (101), February 1986, pp. 1-31.

“Free Entry and Social Inefficiency,” Whinston, M., with N.G. Mankiw. RAND Journal of Economics (17), Spring 1986, pp. 48-58.

“Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion,” Whinston, M., with B.D. Bernheim. RAND Journal of Economics (16), Summer 1985, pp. 269-81.

“Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and the Optimal Provision of Social Insurance,” Journal of Public Economics (22), October 1983, pp. 49-71.


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General Expertise
Competition; Healthcare exchanges; Industrial economics; Industrial organization; Microeconomics