ONLY AVAILABLE IN ELECTRONIC FORM

Electronic Companion-"Generalized Quantity Competition for Multiple Products and Loss of Efficiency" by Jonathan Kluberg and Georgia Perakis, Operations Research, http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.1017.

## Appendix

## A Proof of Lemma 1

Lemma. In a market with differentiated substitute products, a single product per firm and separate capacity constraints for each product, colluding firms always sell less quantity of each product than if they compete freely: $\mathbf{d}^{M P} \leq \mathbf{d}^{O P}$.

Proof. To prove this lemma we first formulate the oligopoly problem (OP) under capacity constraints. It can be written as:

$$
\begin{array}{cc}
\max _{d_{i}} & d_{i} \cdot\left\{\bar{p}_{i}-\left(\mathbf{B}_{i}\right) \cdot\binom{d_{i}}{\mathbf{d}_{-i}^{O P}}\right\} \\
\text { s.t. } & 0 \leq d_{i} \leq C_{i} \leq \bar{d}_{i}
\end{array}
$$

where $\mathbf{B}_{i}$ denotes the row of matrix $\mathbf{B}$ corresponding to firm $i$.

Using notation $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}=\operatorname{diag}(\mathbf{B})$, the corresponding (OP) KKT conditions are:

$$
\overline{\mathbf{p}}-\mathbf{B d}^{O P}-\mathbf{\Gamma}^{O P}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{O P}+\boldsymbol{\mu}^{O P}=0 \quad\left\{\begin{array} { c } 
{ \lambda _ { i } ^ { O P } ( C _ { i } - d _ { i } ^ { O P } ) = 0 } \\
{ \lambda _ { i } ^ { O P } \geq 0 } \\
{ d _ { i } ^ { O P } \leq C _ { i } \leq \overline { d } _ { i } }
\end{array} \quad \left\{\begin{array}{c}
\mu_{i}^{O P} d_{i}^{O P}=0 \\
\mu_{i}^{O P} \geq 0 \\
d_{i}^{O P} \geq 0
\end{array}\right.\right.
$$

Similarly, we write down the monopoly problem (MP) under capacity constraints.

$$
\begin{array}{cc}
\max _{\mathbf{d}} & \mathbf{d} \cdot\{\overline{\mathbf{p}}-\mathbf{B} \cdot \mathbf{d}\} \\
\text { s.t. } & 0 \leq \mathbf{d} \leq \mathbf{C} \leq \overline{\mathbf{d}}
\end{array}
$$

The corresponding (MP) KKT conditions are:

$$
\overline{\mathbf{p}}-2 \mathbf{B} \mathbf{d}^{M P}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{M P}+\boldsymbol{\mu}^{M P}=0 \quad\left\{\begin{array} { c } 
{ ( \boldsymbol { \lambda } ^ { M P } ) ^ { T } ( \mathbf { C } - \mathbf { d } ^ { M P } ) = 0 } \\
{ \boldsymbol { \lambda } ^ { M P } \geq 0 } \\
{ \mathbf { d } ^ { M P } \leq \mathbf { C } \leq \overline { \mathbf { d } } }
\end{array} \quad \left\{\begin{array}{c}
\left(\boldsymbol{\mu}^{M P}\right)^{T} \mathbf{d}^{M P}=0 \\
\boldsymbol{\mu}^{M P} \geq 0 \\
\mathbf{d}^{M P} \geq 0
\end{array}\right.\right.
$$

Step 1: We will prove that $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{O P}=0$
Let us consider the problem that ignores the constraint $\mathbf{d}^{O P} \geq 0$. This suggests we ignore $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{O P}$ and the KKT conditions of problem (OP) become:

$$
\overline{\mathbf{p}}-(\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma}) \mathbf{d}^{O P}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{O P}=0 \quad \text { or } \quad \mathbf{d}^{O P}=(\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma})^{-1}\left(\overline{\mathbf{p}}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{O P}\right)
$$

with $\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma}$ being an inverse M-Matrix (see [1]).

There are two cases to distinguish.

- Either $\lambda_{j}^{O P}>0$, in which case: $d_{j}^{O P}=C_{j}>0$
- Or $\lambda_{j}^{O P}=0$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
d_{j}^{O P} & =(\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma})_{j}^{-1}\left(\overline{\mathbf{p}}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{O P}\right) \\
& =(-\cdots-\underbrace{+}_{j j}-\cdots-)\left(\begin{array}{c}
\bar{p}_{1}-\lambda_{1}^{O P} \\
\bar{p}_{j} \\
\bar{p}_{n}-\lambda_{n}^{O P}
\end{array}\right) \geq(-\cdots-+-\cdots-) \overline{\mathbf{p}} \\
d_{j}^{O P} & \geq(\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma})_{j}^{-1} \mathbf{B} \overline{\mathbf{d}}=(I+\mathbf{M} \boldsymbol{\Gamma})_{j}^{-1} \overline{\mathbf{d}}>0
\end{aligned}
$$

Since $\mathbf{M}$ is an M-matrix, so is $I+\mathbf{M \Gamma}$ (see [1]). Hence $(I+\mathbf{M \Gamma})^{-1}$ has non-negative elements, and the last inequality follows from $\overline{\mathbf{d}}>0$.

Hence, it is always the case that $\mathbf{d}^{O P} \geq 0$ even without including this constraint (i.e. the constraint that $\mathbf{d}^{O P} \geq 0$ ). As a result, $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{O P}=0$.

Step 2: Similarly, we now show that $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{M P}=0$
Following a similar thought process as before, we first consider the problem that ignores $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{M P}$ (that is, ignores the constraint $\mathbf{d}^{M P} \geq 0$ ). Then the KKT conditions of problem (MP) become:

$$
\overline{\mathbf{p}}-2 \mathbf{B} \mathbf{d}^{M P}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{M P}=0 \quad \text { or } \quad \mathbf{d}^{M P}=1 / 2 \mathbf{M}\left(\overline{\mathbf{p}}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{M P}\right)
$$

- Either $\lambda_{j}^{M P}>0$, in which case: $d_{j}^{M P}=C_{j}>0$
- $\operatorname{Or} \lambda_{j}^{M P}=0$,

$$
\begin{align*}
d_{j}^{M P} & =1 / 2 \mathbf{M}_{j}\left(\overline{\mathbf{p}}-\lambda^{M P}\right) \\
& =(-\cdots-\underbrace{+}_{j j}-\cdots-)\left(\begin{array}{c}
\bar{p}_{1}-\lambda_{1}^{M P} \\
\bar{p}_{j} \\
\bar{p}_{n}-\lambda_{n}^{M P}
\end{array}\right) \geq 1 / 2 \mathbf{M}_{j} \overline{\mathbf{p}} \\
d_{j}^{M P} & \geq 1 / 2 \bar{d}_{j}>0 \tag{1}
\end{align*}
$$

## Step 3: Characterization of $\mathbf{d}^{O P}$

Let $K_{1}=\{$ Set of active constraints for the oligopoly problem $\}=\left\{i=1, \ldots, n, \quad \lambda_{i}^{O P}>0\right\}$. We denote by $K_{1}^{c}$ the complement set of $K_{1}$ and by $\mathbf{H}_{A B}$ and $\mathbf{u}_{A}$ the restrictions of matrix $\mathbf{H}$ and
vector $\mathbf{u}$ to rows indexed by $A$ and columns indexed by $B$. Since $K_{1}$ is the set of active capacity constraints for problem $(\mathrm{OP}), \mathbf{d}^{O P}=\binom{d_{K_{1}}^{O P}}{d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P}}=\binom{c_{K_{1}}}{d_{K_{1}^{C}}^{O P}}$.

Since $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{O P}=0$, the oligopoly KKT conditions become:

$$
\overline{\mathbf{p}}-(\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma}) \mathbf{d}^{O P}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{O P}=0
$$

Restricting attention to the set $K_{1}^{c}$ of inactive constraints ( $\lambda_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P}=0$ ) and noting that $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}$ disappears in off-diagonal block matrices:

$$
\overline{\mathbf{p}}_{K_{1}^{c}}-\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}} c_{K_{1}}-(\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma})_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P}=0
$$

Using the relation $\overline{\mathbf{p}}_{K_{1}^{c}}=\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c}} \overline{\mathbf{d}}$, we get:

$$
\begin{align*}
& (\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma})_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P}=\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}} \overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}}+\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} \overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}^{c}}-\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}} c_{K_{1}} \\
\Rightarrow \quad & (\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma})_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P}=\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}}\left(\overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}}-c_{K_{1}}\right)+\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} \overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}^{c}} \tag{2}
\end{align*}
$$

Clearly, on $K_{1}$ we have: $d_{K_{1}}^{O P}=c_{K_{1}} \geq d_{K_{1}}^{M P}$. Hence, to prove the lemma above, we only need to show: $d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P} \geq d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{M P}$.

## Step 4: Characterization of $\mathbf{d}^{M P}$

Let $K_{2}=\{$ Set of active constraints for the monopoly problem $\}=\left\{i=1, \ldots, n, \quad \lambda_{i}^{M P}>0\right\}$. We denote by $K_{2}^{c}$ the complement set of $K_{2}$. Since $K_{2}$ is the set of active capacity constraints for problem (MP), $\mathbf{d}^{M P}=\binom{c_{K_{2}}}{d_{K_{2}^{c}}^{M P}}$.

Since $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{M P}=0$, the monopoly KKT conditions become:

$$
\overline{\mathbf{p}}-2 \mathbf{B} \mathbf{d}^{M P}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{M P}=0
$$

Restricting attention to the set $K_{2}^{c}$ of inactive constraints $\left(\lambda_{K_{2}^{c}}^{M P}=0\right)$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
\overline{\mathbf{p}}_{K_{2}^{c}}-2 \mathbf{B}_{K_{2}^{c}} d^{M P}=0 \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Without loss of generality, we now assume $K_{2} \subseteq K_{1}$ (and hence $K_{2}^{c} \supseteq K_{1}^{c}$ ). If there were constraints in $K_{2} \backslash K_{1}$, we simply remove them. We show that without these constraints $d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{M P} \leq d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P}$ which proves that capacity constraints cannot be active on $d_{K_{1}^{C}}^{M P}$ as they are not active on $d_{K_{1}^{C}}^{O P}$.

Restricting further (3) to $K_{1}^{c}\left(\subseteq K_{2}^{c}\right.$ ) and splitting variables according to $K_{1} \mid K_{1}^{c}$, we get:

$$
\overline{\mathbf{p}}_{K_{1}^{c}}-2 \mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}}\binom{c_{K_{2}}}{d_{K_{1} \backslash K_{2}}^{M P}}-2 \mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{M P}=0
$$

Using the relation $\overline{\mathbf{p}}_{K_{1}^{c}}=\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c}} \overline{\mathbf{d}}$, we get:

$$
\begin{align*}
& 2 \mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{M P}=\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}} \overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}}+\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} \overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}^{c}}-2 \mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}}\binom{c_{K_{2}}}{d_{K_{1} \backslash K_{2}}^{M P}} \\
\Rightarrow \quad & 2 \mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{M P}=\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}}\left(\overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}}-\begin{array}{c}
2 c_{K_{2}} \\
2 d_{K_{1} \backslash K_{2}}^{M P}
\end{array}\right)+\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} \overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}^{c}} \tag{4}
\end{align*}
$$

Step 5: $\mathbf{d}^{O P} \geq \mathbf{d}^{M P}$
As shown in (1), for all $j \in K_{2}^{c}, d_{j}^{M P} \geq 1 / 2 \bar{d}_{j}$. In particurlar:

$$
\begin{align*}
2 d_{K_{1} \backslash K_{2}}^{M P} & \geq \overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1} \backslash K_{2}} \geq c_{K_{1} \backslash K_{2}}  \tag{5}\\
2 d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{M P} & \geq \overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}^{c}} \tag{6}
\end{align*}
$$

On the other hand, combining (2) and (4), we have:

$$
\begin{gather*}
(\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma})_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P}-\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}}\left(\overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}}-c_{K_{1}}\right)=2 \mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{M P}-\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}}\left(\overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}}-\begin{array}{c}
2 c_{K_{2}} \\
2 d_{K_{1} \backslash K_{2}}^{M P}
\end{array}\right) \\
\Rightarrow(\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma})_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P}=2 \mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{M P}+\mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}}\left(\begin{array}{cc}
2 c_{K_{2}} & c_{K_{2}} \\
2 d_{K_{1} \backslash K_{2}}^{M P} & c_{K_{1} \backslash K_{2}}
\end{array}\right) \\
\Rightarrow(\mathbf{B}+\boldsymbol{\Gamma})_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P} \geq 2 \mathbf{B}_{K_{1}^{c} K_{1}^{c}} d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{M P} \tag{7}
\end{gather*}
$$

Finally, let's assume there exist $i \in K_{1}^{c}$ such that $d_{i}^{O P}<d_{i}^{M P}$. Denoting $\left\{s_{1}, \cdots, s_{f}\right\}$ the indices of $K_{1}^{c}$, let's expand the i-th row of (7):

$$
\left(b_{i s_{1}} \cdots 0 \cdots b_{i s_{f}}\right) \underbrace{d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P}}_{\leq \overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}^{c}}}+2 b_{i i} \underbrace{d_{i}^{O P}}_{<d_{i}^{M P}} \geq\left(b_{i s_{1}} \cdots 0 \cdots b_{i s_{f}}\right) \underbrace{2 d_{K_{1}}^{M P}}_{\substack{\geq \overline{\mathbf{d}}_{K_{1}^{c}} \\ \text { using (6) }}}+2 b_{i i} d_{i}^{M P}
$$

Since all the coefficients $b_{i j}$ are non-negative, this is a contradiction.
We just showed that $d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{M P} \leq d_{K_{1}^{c}}^{O P}$, leading to $d^{M P} \leq d^{O P}$.

## B Proof of Step 1 for Theorem 3

Ignoring $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{S P}$, the KKT conditions of problem (SP) become:

$$
\overline{\mathbf{p}}-\mathbf{B} \mathbf{d}^{S P}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{S P}=0 \quad \text { or } \quad \mathbf{d}^{S P}=\mathbf{M}\left(\overline{\mathbf{p}}-\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{S P}\right)
$$

- Either $\lambda_{j}^{S P}>0$, in which case: $d_{j}^{S P}=C_{j}>0$
- Or $\lambda_{j}^{S P}=0$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
d_{j}^{S P} & =\mathbf{M}_{j}\left(\overline{\mathbf{p}}-\lambda^{S P}\right) \\
& =(-\cdots-\underbrace{+}_{j j}-\cdots-)\left(\begin{array}{c}
\bar{p}_{1}-\lambda_{1}^{S P} \\
\bar{p}_{j} \\
\bar{p}_{n}-\lambda_{n}^{S P}
\end{array}\right) \geq \mathbf{M}_{j} \overline{\mathbf{p}} \\
d_{j}^{S P} & \geq \bar{d}_{j}>0
\end{aligned}
$$

## C Calculations for Theorem 4

In the uniform case, matrix $\mathbf{M}$ can be written as:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{M}=\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & -\alpha & \ldots & -\alpha \\
-\alpha & \ddots & & \vdots \\
\vdots & & \ddots & -\alpha \\
-\alpha & \ldots & -\alpha & 1
\end{array}\right) & =(1+\alpha) I-\alpha H \\
& =\Delta\left(\begin{array}{ccccc}
1+\alpha-n \alpha & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & 1+\alpha & & \vdots \\
\vdots & & \ddots & 0 \\
0 & \ldots & 0 & 1+\alpha
\end{array}\right) \Delta^{T}
\end{aligned}
$$

Inverting M, we get matrix $\mathbf{B}$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{B} & =\frac{1}{1+\alpha}\left(I-\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha} H\right)^{-1} \\
& =\frac{1}{1+\alpha}\left[I+\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha}\left(1+\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha} n+\cdots\right) H\right] \\
& =\frac{1}{1+\alpha}\left[I+\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha-n \alpha} H\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

This allows us to compute:

$$
\boldsymbol{\Gamma}=\operatorname{diag}(\mathbf{B})=\frac{1+2 \alpha-n \alpha}{(1+\alpha)(1+\alpha-n \alpha)} I
$$

On the other hand, diagonalizing $\mathbf{B}$ as we did with $\mathbf{M}$ :

$$
\mathbf{B}=\Delta\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
\frac{1}{1+\alpha-n \alpha} & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\
0 & \frac{1}{1+\alpha} & & \vdots \\
\vdots & & \ddots & 0 \\
0 & \ldots & 0 & \frac{1}{1+\alpha}
\end{array}\right) \Delta^{T}
$$

We are now able to compute the diverse component of the surplus ratio.

$$
\begin{gathered}
I+\mathbf{M} \boldsymbol{\Gamma}=\Delta\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
\frac{2+3 \alpha-n \alpha}{1+\alpha} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & \frac{2+3 \alpha-2 n \alpha}{1+\alpha-n \alpha} & & \vdots \\
\vdots & & \ddots & 0 \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & \frac{2+3 \alpha-2 n \alpha}{1+\alpha-n \alpha}
\end{array}\right) \Delta^{T} \\
(I+\mathbf{M \Gamma})^{-1}=\Delta\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
\frac{1+\alpha}{2+3 \alpha-n \alpha} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & \frac{1+\alpha-n \alpha}{2+3 \alpha-2 n \alpha} & & \vdots \\
\vdots & & \ddots & 0 \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & \frac{1+\alpha-n \alpha}{2+3 \alpha-2 n \alpha}
\end{array}\right) \Delta^{T}
\end{gathered}
$$

Let's call $\mathbf{d}$ the vector whose components are the eigenvectors of $\mathbf{M}$, and $\left[\breve{\rho}_{1}, \breve{\rho}_{2}\right]$ the two eigenvalues of: $(I+\boldsymbol{\Gamma} \mathbf{M})^{-1} \boldsymbol{\Gamma}(I+\mathbf{M} \boldsymbol{\Gamma})^{-1}$.

- $\breve{\rho}_{1}=\frac{(1+\alpha)(1+2 \alpha-n \alpha)}{(2+3 \alpha-n \alpha)^{2}(1+\alpha-n \alpha)}$
- $\breve{\rho}_{2}=\frac{(1+\alpha-n \alpha)(1+2 \alpha-n \alpha)}{(2+3 \alpha-2 n \alpha)^{2}(1+\alpha)}$

The ratio of profits becomes:

$$
\frac{\Pi(O P)}{\Pi(M P)}=\frac{4\left(\breve{\rho}_{1} \breve{d}_{1}^{2}+\breve{\rho}_{2} \sum_{i=2}^{n} \breve{d}_{i}^{2}\right)}{\frac{1}{1+\alpha-n \alpha} \breve{d}_{1}^{2}+\frac{1}{1+\alpha} \sum_{i=2}^{n} \breve{d}_{i}^{2}}
$$

## D Proof of Lemma 1

Lemma. For a symmetric inverse M-matrix B and a vector d with all component positive, the following inequality holds:

$$
\|\mathbf{d}\|_{\mathbf{B}}^{2} \leq(1+r \cdot(n m-1))\|\mathbf{d}\|_{\mathbf{B}^{\text {Bdiag }}}^{2}
$$

where $r$ is the market power.
Proof. Since B is an inverse M-matrix, Ostrowski shows in [3] that:

$$
B_{i j}^{k l} \leq r_{k l} B_{i j}^{i j} \quad \text { and } \quad B_{i j}^{k l}=B_{k l}^{i j} \leq r_{i j} B_{k l}^{k l}
$$

Introducing $r=\max _{k l} r_{k l}$, we have: $B_{i j}^{k l} \leq r \sqrt{B_{i j}^{i j} B_{k l}^{k l}}$.

Hence, we can write:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\|\mathbf{d}\|_{\mathbf{B}}^{2} & \leq \mathbf{d}^{T}\left(\begin{array}{ccc}
B_{11}^{11} & \ldots & r \sqrt{B_{i j}^{i j} B_{k l}^{k l}} \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
r \sqrt{B_{i j}^{i j} B_{k l}^{k l}} & \ldots & B_{n m}^{n m}
\end{array}\right) \mathbf{d} \\
& =\mathbf{d}^{T}\left(\begin{array}{ccc} 
\\
r B_{11}^{11} & \ldots & r \sqrt{B_{i j}^{i j} B_{k l}^{k l}} \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
r \sqrt{B_{i j}^{i j} B_{k l}^{k l}} & \ldots & r B_{n m}^{n m}
\end{array}\right) \mathbf{d}+\mathbf{d}^{T}\left(\begin{array}{ccc}
(1-r) B_{11}^{11} & \ldots & 0 \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & \ldots & (1-r) B_{n m}^{n m}
\end{array}\right) \mathbf{d}
\end{aligned}
$$

We denote the diagonal matrix corresponding to the diagonal of matrix $\mathbf{B}$ by:

$$
\boldsymbol{\Gamma}=\operatorname{diag}\left(B_{11}^{11}, \cdots, B_{n m}^{n m}\right)
$$

We obtain:

$$
\|\mathbf{d}\|_{\mathbf{B}}^{2} \leq r \mathbf{d}^{T} \sqrt{\boldsymbol{\Gamma}}\left(\begin{array}{ccc}
1 & \ldots & 1 \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
1 & \ldots & 1
\end{array}\right) \sqrt{\boldsymbol{\Gamma}} \mathbf{d}+(1-r) \mathbf{d}^{T} \boldsymbol{\Gamma} \mathbf{d}
$$

Since $\mathbf{H}=\left(\begin{array}{ccc}1 & \ldots & 1 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & \ldots & 1\end{array}\right)$ has two eigenvalues 0 and $n m$, we have $\mathbf{d}^{T} \mathbf{H d} \leq n m\|\mathbf{d}\|^{2}$ for all $\mathbf{d}$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\|\mathbf{d}\|_{\mathbf{B}}^{2} & \leq r \cdot n m \mathbf{d}^{T} \boldsymbol{\Gamma} \mathbf{d}+(1-r) \mathbf{d}^{T} \boldsymbol{\Gamma} \mathbf{d} \\
& \leq(1+r \cdot(n m-1))\|\mathbf{d}\|_{\mathbf{B}^{\text {Bdiag }}}^{2}
\end{aligned}
$$

## E Derivation of oligopoly variational inequality

At a Nash equilibrium solution, the optimization problem facing a single firm is:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \max _{\mathbf{d}_{i}} \mathbf{d}_{i} \cdot\left\{\overline{\mathbf{p}}_{i}-\left(\begin{array}{c}
B_{i 1} \\
\vdots \\
B_{i m}
\end{array}\right) \cdot\binom{\mathbf{d}_{i}}{\mathbf{d}_{-i}^{O P}}\right\}  \tag{8}\\
& \text { s.t. } \\
& \mathbf{d}_{i} \in K_{i}
\end{align*}
$$

This problem is a maximization of a concave objective function over a convex set, it is a convex problem. A general convex problem of the form:

$$
\begin{array}{cc}
\max _{x} & F(x) \\
\text { s.t. } & x \in K
\end{array}
$$

with a concave objective $F(x)$ is equivalent (see [2], [4]) to the variational inequality problem:

$$
\text { Find } x_{0} \in K: \quad-\nabla F\left(x_{0}\right)\left(x-x_{0}\right) \geq 0 \quad \forall x \in K
$$

Applying this to (8), we obtain for each firm $i$ :

$$
\text { Find } \mathbf{d}_{i}^{O P} \in K_{i}: \quad\left\{-\overline{\mathbf{p}}_{i}+\mathbf{B}_{i} \cdot \mathbf{d}^{O P}+\mathbf{B}_{i}^{i} \cdot \mathbf{d}_{i}^{O P}\right\}^{T}\left(\mathbf{d}_{i}-\mathbf{d}_{i}^{O P}\right) \geq 0 \quad \forall \mathbf{d}_{i} \in K_{i}
$$

where $\mathbf{B}_{i}$ denotes the rows of matrix $\mathbf{B}$ corresponding to firm $i$.

Now, since the constraint set of each firm $i$ is independent of the quantities chosen by other firms, it is equivalent to satisfy every one of these variational inequalitites (for firm $i$ ) or to satisfy the sum of these inequalities. Clearly, if $\mathbf{d}^{O P}$ satisfies all these inequalities it satisfies the sum of the inequalities. On the other hand if $\mathbf{d}^{O P}$ satisfies the sum of the inequalities, by choosing $\mathbf{d}=\left(\mathbf{d}_{i}, \mathbf{d}_{-i}^{O P}\right)$ for all $\mathbf{d}_{i} \in K_{i}$, it is easy to check that it will satisfy every variational inequality separately as well. The sum of these inequalities is exactly the variational inequality used in this paper:

$$
\text { Find } \mathbf{d}^{O P} \in K: \quad\left\{-\overline{\mathbf{p}}+\mathbf{B} \cdot \mathbf{d}^{O P}+\mathbf{B}^{\text {Bdiag }} \cdot \mathbf{d}^{O P}\right\}^{T}\left(\mathbf{d}-\mathbf{d}^{O P}\right) \geq 0 \quad \forall \mathbf{d} \in K
$$

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