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# Metrics: You Are What You Measure!

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**Metrics are used by firms for a variety of commendable purposes. The authors maintain that every metric, however used, will affect actions and decisions. But, of course, choosing the right one is critical to success.**

**The authors focus on the selection of good metrics and, based on their own experience and the academic literature, summarize seven pitfalls in the use of metrics which can cause them to be counterproductive and fail. The article then goes on to outline a seven-step system to design effective, 'lean' metrics, which depends on a close understanding of customers, employees, work processes, and the underlying properties of metrics themselves.**

Firms use metrics for a variety of laudable purposes. Metrics such as market share, sales increases, margins, and customer satisfaction surveys enable firms to take stock of where they are and to plan for the future. Metrics such as projected revenue, contingent sales forecasts, the net present value of an investment, and the option value of an R&D program provide indicators of future performance. Managers use these metrics to allocate assets and select strategies. Metrics such as an R&D effectiveness index, reductions in the operating cost of a telephone service center, and reduced absenteeism provide the basis for bonuses and promotions for managers and their employees.

Our thesis is that every metric, whether it is used explicitly to influence behavior, to evaluate future strategies, or simply to take stock, will affect actions and decisions. If a brand manager knows that, in his or her company's culture, a 'good brand is a high share brand,' he or she will make decisions to maximize market share — even if those decisions inadvertently sacrifice long-term profit or adversely affect other brands in the company's portfolio. If an R&D manager knows that projects are chosen based on projected net present value (NPV), he or she will encourage research scientists and engineers to work on programs and make forecasts which make NPV look good — even if the NPV calculations are misleading. If a telephone service center manager is rewarded for reduced absenteeism he or she will seek to do well on the firm's measure of absenteeism — even if the measure does not lead to improved productivity. For example, Kerr (1975) cites a case where the firm measured the number of instances an employee was absent, but not *how long* they were absent. From a manager's standpoint, if an employee missed a Monday, it was better for the employee to stay out all week than to come back for three days and then miss a Friday.

The link is simple. If a firm measures *a*, *b*, and *c*, but not *x*, *y*, and *z*, then managers begin to pay more attention to *a*, *b*, and *c*. Soon those managers who do well on *a*, *b*, and *c* are promoted or are given more responsibilities. Increased pay and bonuses follow. Recognizing these rewards, managers start asking their employees to make decisions and take actions that improve the metrics. (Often, they don't even need to ask!) Soon the entire organization is focused on ways to improve the metrics. The firm gains core strengths in producing *a*, *b*, and *c*. *The firm becomes what it measures.*

If maximizing  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$  leads to long-term profit, the metrics are effective. If  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$  lead to counterproductive decisions and actions, then the metrics have failed. But it is even worse! Once the enterprise is committed to these metrics, the metrics gain tremendous inertia. Those who know how to maximize  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$  fear to change course. It is extremely hard to refocus the enterprise on new goals.

Choosing the right metrics is critical to success, but the road to good metrics is fraught with pitfalls. We recently worked with a credit card company to improve its products. This company had a long-standing tradition of using metrics, displaying more than 100 different measures in their lobby for all to see. One critical metric focused on the quality of the plastic used in their credit cards — no bubbles or blemishes were tolerated. But after talking to customers, we found that customers never noticed the blemishes as long as the magnetic strip on the back worked. On the other hand, customers were extremely concerned with other aspects of the service. By focusing on the quality of the plastic, the company was diverting resources away from issues that mattered to customers. By truly listening to and understanding the customer, we helped this company reduce the number of their metrics by more than half and refocus efforts toward those aspects of the service which increased revenues and enhanced profit.

This paper focuses on the selection of good metrics. There is no magic bullet. Many metrics seem right and are easy to measure, but have subtle, counterproductive consequences. Other metrics are more difficult to measure, but focus the enterprise on those decisions and actions that are critical to success. We suggest how to identify metrics that achieve balance in these effects and enhance long-term profitability. To gain an understanding of the properties of good metrics we begin with a summary of how metrics fail. These seven pitfalls provide examples of where metrics have produced counterproductive results. We then suggest a seven-step system to design effective, 'lean' metrics. We base our recommendations on our own experience and on concepts drawn from the quality movement, from product and service design, from organizational studies, and from recent management theory. These concepts include The Voice of the Customer, The Voice of the Employee, the House of Quality matrix (drawn from the Quality Function Deployment [QFD] process), metrics tracking, employee involvement, and creative management.

## **Seven Pitfalls That Lead to Counterproductive Metrics**

A good metric is precise, tied to overall profit, applicable to all employees, and designed to encourage extranormal effort — or is it? These are all desirable properties, but if pushed to their limits, they lead to counterproductive actions. In this section we highlight seven pitfalls that we have seen in practice. Wherever possible we back up these recommendations with citations from the academic literature.

### **Pitfall 1: Delaying Rewards**

It is rational for any employee or manager to be more short-term oriented than the firm. Managers and employees change jobs or are promoted. They may not be around to collect future rewards. A manager or employee might do his or her job well and it might maximize long-term profit, but it might be hard to tie that profit back to that manager or employee. Change happens. Promises of future rewards might never be fulfilled. People have mortgages, face college tuition, and have other pressing needs. All of these phenomena imply that any rewards which depend upon future outcomes will be discounted more by managers and employees than by the firm. In the 'present,' when the actions and decisions are being made, rewards will be under-valued if they occur too far

in the future. Metrics such as 10-year sales, 5-year revenue, long-term cost reductions, reduced lifetime product development costs, or defects discovered over the life of the product, all delay rewards and bias employees toward decisions and actions that have shorter-term payoffs.

To avoid this pitfall, you should look for metrics that can be measured today but which impact future outcomes. For example, Hauser *et al.* (1996) show how measures of customer satisfaction can be used to encourage customer-contact employees to make the 'right' tradeoffs between actions and decisions that have immediate impact and those that have enduring long-term impact. By 'right,' we mean that the employees make tradeoffs that maximize long-term profit *to the firm*.

## **Pitfall 2: Using Risky Rewards**

It is much more difficult for individual managers and employees to diversify risk than it is for the firm.<sup>1</sup> While few managers and employees bear all the risk resulting from their actions and decisions, they do bear some. A business unit manager expects praise, promotions, and, perhaps, bonuses, if the business unit does well on sales, revenue, or profit targets. An employee expects praise, promotions, and bonuses if his or her product development team develops a successful new product.

Any metric that depends on an uncertain outcome from influences that are beyond their control imposes risk on the manager or employee. Managers and employees who cannot diversify this risk are likely to be risk averse. They will value guaranteed outcomes more than risky outcomes even if the risky outcomes have the same expected value to the firm. Put another way, there is a 'risk cost' associated with any metric based on vague or uncertain outcomes that are beyond the control of the managers and employees subject to the metrics.<sup>2</sup>

For example, consider the R&D effectiveness index, EI, proposed by McGrath and Romeri (1994). This index, roughly equal to the per cent of profit obtained from new products divided by the per cent of revenue spent on R&D, attempts to measure R&D effectiveness based on the net revenue that R&D contributes to the firm.<sup>3</sup> But R&D is one of the most risky and long-term investments that the firm can make. If managers and employees perceive that they are rewarded based on EI, then they will prefer projects that are less risky (and more short-term oriented). This effect can be huge. Hauser (1998) demonstrates that a significant fraction of R&D projects can be falsely rejected or falsely selected if EI is the only metric. He shows further that a firm can balance this effect by placing a smaller reward on EI and a larger one on other metrics that are less risky to the individual researcher.

Fortunately, some firms are experimenting with metrics that allow them to manage risk through the use of 'options.' See Mitchell and Hamilton (1988) and Faulkner (1996). In an analogy to financial options (e.g. Black and Scholes, 1973), metrics are used to reward upside potential while limiting the firm's downside risk. Naturally, these metrics assume that the firm has the discipline to de-escalate commitments when necessary (Boulding *et al.*, 1997; Simonson and Staw, 1992; Staw, 1976).

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<sup>1</sup> Even if the firm cannot diversify risk, investors in publicly traded firms can diversity risk in the stock market.

<sup>2</sup> We can assign a numerical value to this risk cost. See Keeney and Raiffa (1976).

<sup>3</sup> Specifically, their effectiveness index (EI) is equal to  $(\% \text{ of revenue from new products}) * [(\% \text{ of revenue that is profit}) / (\% \text{ of revenue spent on R\&D}) + 1]$ .

### **Pitfall 3: Making Metrics Hard to Control**

Consider the engineering team charged with the design of the door for a new automobile. This is an extremely important job. Car doors have complex electrical and mechanical subsystems. They interact with ride and handling, with passenger comfort, with noise control, with styling, with power (through wind resistance and weight), and with many other component of the automobile. A good design clearly influences sales at some level.

Nonetheless, the car door is only one of many components in the automobile design.<sup>4</sup> Sales also depend upon the actions of many suppliers, dealers, and competitors, and upon decisions the firm has yet to make about advertising and promotions. The macro economy affects sales as do interactions with other automobiles in the firm's product line. The car door engineering team may affect revenues, but any change in revenue directly attributable to the team is probably small. From the team's perspective, the effect is tenuous at best.

However, the team can affect other metrics more directly. Its decisions and actions directly affect metrics such as the time it takes to design the door or the per cent of parts that are re-used from a previous design. Even if the revenue and cost metrics are valued equally by the firm, the engineering team will be influenced more by the metrics it affects directly than by those for which it has only a small impact. It is easy to imagine the team avoiding a decision to spend six months redesigning the door with an entirely new part even though that redesign might be in the firm's best long-term interest.

To overcome this pitfall, the firm must identify metrics that the team can effect today, but which, ultimately, will affect the firm's long-term goals. For example, we argue later in this paper that the firm can do better by rewarding the team for satisfying those customer needs which are most directly affected by the car door design. We suggest methods to identify such needs and to link them to the decisions the team can make and the actions they can take.

### **Pitfall 4: Losing Sight of the Goal**

We worked with an office furniture manufacturer a few years ago on the design of seating products. This manufacturer, which wanted to create chairs that were highly durable, was using sophisticated testing procedures to assure durability. The engineering design and the quality-testing teams were among the best in the business. However, as part of a desire to continually improve profit, the firm questioned established procedures to determine whether it was measuring the right things. After all, few of their chairs ever failed, and many in the firm expressed the belief that their products were 'over-engineered.' Furthermore, there were few users who weighed 550 kg and few users who would ever sit down 50,000 times over the lifetime of the chair. While such over-designed durability might be good at some level, this over-engineering added significant cost to the chair and limited the ability of the engineers to provide other valued features to the customer. By refocusing and balancing the ultimate goals of customer satisfaction and long-term profit, the firm was able to modify its metrics to encourage better designs.

In other instances, misaligned metrics can be more subtle. For example, many R&D organizations seek to identify the best scientists and engineers by tallying the new ideas, new concepts, new technologies, or new science that these employees discover. As a result, internally discovered ideas,

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<sup>4</sup> One firm told us that the redesign for a typical automobile requires over 1000 person-years of engineering effort.

concepts, technologies, and science ('ideas' for short) weigh heavily in the incentive system. Soon the organization values internal 'ideas' to the exclusion of all others. Quickly a 'not-invented-here' culture takes hold. This, in turn, leads to internal research 'empires' that may be larger than necessary. Ultimately, more internal 'ideas,' but, in total, fewer 'ideas' are identified than would otherwise be profitable for the firm (Hauser, 1998).

But the goal is not *internal* 'ideas.' The goal is the ability to be competitive and profitable based on 'ideas.' Today, many firms believe that their core competence is the ability to exploit the profitability of 'ideas' better than their competitors. If this is the case, then the firm should value all 'ideas' no matter what their source.<sup>5</sup> If the firm rewards all 'ideas' and encourages managers, scientists, and engineers to look outside the firm when necessary, it can overcome the 'not-invented-here' syndrome and become more profitable.

Notice that we did not recommend rewarding R&D managers and researchers for the profit impact of their 'ideas.' This would have fallen prey to the traps of pitfalls 1, 2, and 3.

The key concept is not that the metrics themselves must have a direct causal effect on eventual outcomes (or other macro goals). The key concept is that the metrics are chosen so that actions and decisions which move the metrics in the desired direction also move the firm's desired outcomes in the same direction. It is even better if the metrics can be measured sooner, and with less uncertainty, than the outcomes (see Figure 1).<sup>6</sup>


For example, consider a sales team, a product development team, and a basic research team. A sales team directly affects revenue by its selling effort. Revenue, or sales times margins, might be a good metric for the sales force. The product development team also affects revenue, but less directly and less immediately. Near-term revenue is a reasonable metric, but the firm may also want to use surrogates, such as customer satisfaction, to represent long-term revenue. The firm might also include metrics such as cycle time, development cost, and synergies with other products in the line. The team can affect these directly and, if they are chosen carefully, the actions the team takes to affect these metrics are the same actions that produce long-term profit for the firm. By the time we get to the research team, its actions are far removed from immediate revenue. Thus, the firm seeks metrics which, when maximized, lead to high-quality, seminal research that the firm might later exploit. Indeed, the common practice of measuring the number of articles that the research scientists publish in the top technical journals might, by Figure I, be rational. Few research managers would argue that publications themselves lead to profit. In fact, there is a danger that such publications might tip off competitors. But if the actions that the scientists take to discover publishable 'ideas' are the same actions that lead to profitable 'ideas' for the firm, then publications might be a good metric.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Such a statement is now part of the vision statement of General Motors Corporation. See Hauser and Zettelmeyer (1997).

<sup>6</sup> This argument is formalized by Baker *et al.* (1994) and Gibbons (1997). If  $O$  is outcomes,  $m$  is the metric, and  $e$  is effort, then the firm wants  $\partial O/\partial e$  and  $\partial m/\partial e$  to be correlated across projects or over time.

<sup>7</sup> In reality, R&D laboratories combine a variety of such 'effort' metrics. Some laboratories further refine the measures to include only highly cited 'star' articles.



**Figure 1: Metrics are Good if the Actions and Decisions which Improve the Metrics also Improve the Firm's Desired Long-Term Outcomes**

### **Pitfall 5: Choosing Metrics That Are Precisely Wrong**

There is a natural desire on the part of many managers to seek precise metric, things that can be measured with great accuracy. But precision can be misleading. Metrics can be precisely wrong.

We worked with a variety of services firms: financial services, healthcare providers, insurance providers, and public utilities. In many of these cases a services firm sought to enhance its customers' satisfaction with a telephone-service center.<sup>8</sup> In an effort to create incentives for the telephone representatives, the firm began to measure a variety of metrics including the number of rings until the phone was answered, the time spent in the queue until a live representative could come on the line, the number of calls answered per hour by each representative, the number of times the customer was put on hold, and the per cent of each hour that each representative spent connected to a customer. All of these metrics could be measured easily, accurately, and automatically by the telephone equipment.

Soon the firm improved dramatically on all of these measures, but the customers were still dissatisfied. In candid conversations with the telephone service center employees, we came to understand how these metrics impacted their behavior. To increase the number of calls per hour and be ready to answer the next call immediately, telephone representatives (reps) rushed customers and gave them the most convenient answer. Some reps even 'gamed' the system by hanging up on a customer or two immediately after answering (without saying anything) in order to improve their metrics, hoping that no one would be the wiser! To decrease the number of times the customer was put on hold, reps were reluctant to transfer a call, even if they themselves did not know the answer. The service center became precisely what it measured — a place to process lots of calls quickly.

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<sup>8</sup> For ease of exposition and to maintain confidentiality we have merged the lessons from a variety of firms in the 'services' example described in this paper. All examples occurred with at least one of these firms, often more.

However, customer research showed that customers did not just want *quick* answers — they wanted *accurate* answers. Most customers would not mind waiting an extra ring or staying on the telephone a bit longer if they were then connected or transferred to a knowledgeable person who could answer their question accurately. Accuracy was much harder to measure than speed, but that was the true goal. ‘Accuracy’ and ‘customer-satisfaction’ measures were less precise, but far more relevant to the real goals of the telephone service center.

How did the firm respond? First, they altered their information system to include a data field in which the rep could enter the customer’s problem or question. After six months, the firm calculated the per cent of calls that involved a problem or question that had been previously reported or asked by the same customer. An astounding 23 per cent of all calls fit this description! By focusing on reducing this metric, customer satisfaction scores finally started to improve. An interesting side benefit was that, by doing so, call volume decreased, further reducing pressure on the reps to handle calls quickly.

Some firms develop ‘expert panels’ to measure imprecise metrics. For instance, the Arthur D. Little Company operates one of the most famous quality control laboratories in the world for sensory analysis. Many attributes of food products can be measured with great precision by laboratory equipment. However, there are some attributes which defy laboratory measurement. Examples include sweetness and fruitiness (Acree, 1995) or richness, fullness, and balance (Roussel *et al.*, 1991). By training and common agreement, expert panelists develop their own definitions and rating scales. These subjective methods can become key metrics in product design and quality control procedures.

The lesson: measure what is truly important, not just what is easy to measure. Vaguely right is better than precisely wrong!<sup>9</sup>

### **Pitfall 6: Assuming Your Managers and Employees Have No Options**

Most managers and employees work hard. The goal of a metrics system should be to make them work smarter. The better the people, the better they are at redirecting their decisions and actions to maximize metrics. The best people are probably already working very hard. If the metrics system requires they work harder still, you will probably have to pay them more, or lose them.

Consider a manager who is already working 60 hours per week for a salary of \$2000 per week. If you could hire other managers, just as good and with knowledge of your system, for close to that salary, then you are paying market wages. Put another way, your manager probably has outside options close to \$2000. Now suppose you impose ‘stretch’ metrics that require the manager to put in an extra 20 hours per week. He or she may do it for a while, but only long enough to polish his or her résumé. When such stretch metrics are imposed on a group of managers, it is even worse. The best people leave first! The only people that remain are those who are not in demand by your competitors.

There’s no such thing as a free lunch. If the metrics system requires more effort and that effort is perceived as costly to the manager, then soon you will have to pay for the increased effort. If the metrics system imposes greater risk or time delays, then soon you will have to pay for that increased risk or time delay. It may be worth it — but it does not come free. When designing a

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<sup>9</sup> This phrase was originally coined by Lodish (1974) in the context of salesforce allocations.

metrics system it is important that you take into consideration the alternatives that are available to your managers and employees.

As a corollary to Pitfall 6, we recommend that you consider only 'lean' metrics, i.e. those that do not require a great deal of additional cost or effort to measure. We have seen organizations where managers and employees spend a significant fraction of their time just collecting the data on 'fat' metrics. If a metrics measurement system requires 10 per cent of the productive time available, then the metrics system had better raise productivity by more than 11 per cent just to break even. If the metrics measurement system requires 20 per cent of the productive time, productivity needs to rise by 25 per cent.<sup>10</sup>

### **Pitfall 7: Thinking Narrowly**

The last pitfall sits squarely on the shoulders of top management. Do not be paradigm bound.

In Pitfall 5 we talked about the 'right' kind of metrics for a telephone service center. But why do we need a telephone service center in the first place? What if we designed our products so that they were so easy to use that customers never needed to call our service center? Impossible? Perhaps. But this was exactly the goal that Scott Cook, President of Intuit Software, set out to accomplish (Case, 1991). The telephone service reps were asked to record customer questions and problems. They were rewarded for communicating these issues to software designers so that the next version of the software could anticipate problems and solve them before they became problems. Market researchers literally followed customers home, watched them learn to use the software, and listened to their needs. The entire organization was oriented toward discovering and correcting problems before they occurred. Furthermore, Intuit took ownership of every problem. Even if the technical cause of the problem was a printer driver designed by a hardware manufacturer, Intuit took responsibility for the solution. In contrast to the services firms which focused on answering customer questions and solving problems, Intuit focused on anticipating customer questions and preventing problems from ever occurring.

## **Seven Steps Toward Good Metrics**

### **Designing a Metrics System is Hard Work**

It is easy to select a metric; it is hard to select a good metric. The seven pitfalls are difficult to avoid. Management wants to tie pay to performance, but if tying pay to performance delays rewards or exposes managers and employees to undue risk, then the metric will have unintended implications. Bonuses based on stock price make sense for the few people near the top who really affect stock price, but the further down we go into the organization, the less clearly decisions and actions are directly tied to stock price. If stock price is not tied closely to decisions and actions, rewards based on stock price will have little effect on the managers' and employees' decisions and actions. Precise metrics are desirable but beware of false precision. Metrics that count things (calls answered, days absent, quarterly sales) can often be measured precisely, but if they do not align the motivations of managers and employees with the long-term goals of the firm, then they become counterproductive.

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<sup>10</sup> If the metrics system requires  $t$  per cent of productive time then this leaves only  $(1 - t)$  per cent of productive time to achieve the firm's goals. Thus, productivity must increase by  $1/(1 - t)$  per cent just to break even.

Fortunately good metrics *can* be identified. We describe a seven-step system to identify good metrics. This system is based on a thorough understanding of customers, employees, work processes, and the underlying properties of metrics. It is a flexible system that can be adapted to any organization by placing different emphasis on various steps.

### **Step 1. Start by Listening to the Customer**

This first suggestion sounds almost naïve, but it is remarkable how often it is overlooked. In practice, most metrics tend to be centered around internal corporate needs such as asset utilization, staff productivity, cost reduction, and cycle time. While these needs are all honorable and very real, they usually have little direct impact on the customers' needs. Profits require sales and sales require customers. Customers purchase products and services that fulfil their needs better (and at a lower price) than current options. In order to fulfil those needs profitably, the firm has to understand those needs.

The first step must be to actually go out and talk to the customer. This sounds simple, but it rarely is. The first question is: *Who is the customer?*

Let's return to the office furniture example. The end consumer who uses office furniture is one customer. For the office chair, the design team needs to understand consumer needs for functionality, comfort, durability, back support, etc. The firm should use Figure 1 to choose metrics that provide the incentives for the team to make decisions and take actions which improve the office chair design (and related office furniture designs) with respect to these end consumer needs.

But there are other customers. Office furniture purchases, like purchases of most commercial products and services, are characterized by a complex web of multiple decision makers and influencers. For office furniture these include: (1) facilities managers who must move, assemble, disassemble, reconfigure, and maintain the equipment, (2) financial managers who must decide how much the company can spend on the furniture, (3) purchasing managers who negotiate the terms of the contract, (4) human resources managers who must deal with health, safety, and ergonomic issues, (5) information systems managers who must run thousands of kilometers of cable through cubicle and building walls in order to provide voice, data, lighting, and electrical power to each and every employee, and (6) the architects and designers who provide influential recommendations and who assess both aesthetic appeal and the relationship to the firm's image.

Furthermore, there are many subsystems in the overall office furniture system. Product development teams must design chairs, integrated desks, filing systems, and dividers. Components must be purchased, the subsystems must be manufactured, the entire system must be assembled, and the brand must be marketed and sold. By standardizing components with other product lines, the team can reduce total costs. By matching the architecture of chairs and desks, with that of other subsystems, the chair and desk teams can enhance quality, reduce cycle time, and enhance consumer desirability for the entire office system. By designing for manufacturability and for assembly, the chair and desk teams can reduce production time and costs. By coordinating with the marketing and sales teams, the chair and desk teams can make sure that their design matches the overall market image of the office system.

There are many methods for listening to the Voice of the Customer — for all of these customers. See Griffin and Hauser (1993) for a review. We have worked with firms in nearly three dozen industries such as automotive, medical equipment, telecommunications, gas and electric utilities, power

generation, transportation, financial services, consumer package goods, computer hardware and software, photographic equipment, office furniture, entertainment, apparel, shipping, government services, education, healthcare, gas and oil drilling, and heavy industrial equipment. Although the specific method must be adapted to the unique characteristics of each industry, the basic concepts remain constant. The Voice of the Customer consists of a set of words and phrases that describe, in the customers' vocabulary, what the customer wants or desires in a product or service.

Consider the following six phrases as examples of the 17 needs that we identified for a specialized imaging product. Notice that they are sufficiently broad to allow a variety of solutions, but sufficiently specific to describe the product category.

- Produces a sharp image
- Anyone can use
- Can switch image types without waste
- Compact and portable
- Equipment and supplies always available
- Equipment looks serious and professional

Likewise, the following six phrases are examples of some of the 25 needs that we identified for a telephone service center. These needs were used in the metrics project described earlier.

- Easy to get through at any time
- Always able to talk to a real person
- Able to have things taken care of in one phone call
- The first person to answer is able to handle your call
- Phone center works smoothly and efficiently
- Phone system menu options are brief and fit my needs

Furthermore, these six phrases can be aggregated to form even higher-level needs, in this case 'Accessibility.' They can also be disaggregated to provide more detailed information.

Customer needs are best determined by direct interviews with customers. We normally tape record these interviews, transcribe the recordings, identify the words and phrases, and 'winnow' these words and phrases to identify a unique set. We then ask customers to sort the needs and provide prioritization of the needs.

These needs are not yet metrics. They are indicators of the outcomes that, ultimately, lead to long-term profit. If the Voice of the Customer is sufficiently detailed, these customers' needs can be tied to the decisions and actions of the imaging system or the telephone service center design team. We then search for metrics which align those decisions and actions with the long-term profitability of the firm. These metrics become the 'knobs' we turn to focus managers and employees on fulfilling customer needs profitably.

## **Step 2. Understand the Job**

After we understand the customer, we must understand the managers and employees. We need answers to the following questions: What do managers and employees value? And how do their decisions and actions affect the metrics and the desired outcomes? The methods are analogous to the Voice of the Customer, but we now focus on the firm's own managers and employees. We call this step 'The Voice of the Employee (VOE).'

*What managers and employees value.* Managers and employees value more than salary and bonuses. They value respect, the ability to learn new skills, an interesting and exciting challenge, the chance to choose the assignment upon which they will work, the perception that their rewards are fair relative to their peers, a good work environment, and a feeling that they themselves provide value. These are but a few of the phrases we have heard from interviews with employees all the way from the factory floor to the highest professional ranks. More importantly, these 'softer' rewards have high monetary value. For example, in interviews with 121 US executives, Wernerfelt *et al.* (1997) found that these soft rewards had high values relative to monetary salaries. In their sample, the average salary was \$62,000 per year. But relative to that, the average executive placed a value on 'respect' at over \$13,000 and on 'clear expectations' at almost \$5000.

We are often able to identify rewards that are low in cost to the firm but high in value to the employees. For example, employees at the telephone service center of an electric utility felt isolated from the power generation and transmission parts of the organization. As a reward for improvements in their customer satisfaction scores, they requested a day to tour a power plant, something that most utility phone reps never experience! The firm was more than happy to provide this reward.

*How decisions and actions affect metrics and desired outcomes.* We worked with a government research and engineering center that wanted to enhance its performance and results. But before we could evaluate candidate metrics, we had to understand how the scientists, engineers, managers, and support personnel produced results. We interviewed a representative sample of all of the center's employees in order to identify and classify their daily tasks. Some activities related directly to the center's core output while other activities enhanced its capability to do so. Still other activities enabled communication among critical employees, 'sold' research to internal customers, and kept costs down. Other activities maintained an attractive working environment and enhanced collegiality.

Such an understanding of work processes is critical to the implementation of a metrics system. If we measure time and effort allocations under the current metrics system, this becomes a baseline against which changes can be measured. If the metrics system is effective, then employees change their efforts in response to the new metrics system and these efforts improve outcomes. By first creating a detailed map of work processes, we track and diagnose these changes to improve the implementation of new metrics.

Sometimes a detailed understanding of the work process provides simple solutions to critical bottlenecks. By removing these bottlenecks we make it easier for employees to change their behavior in response to a metrics system. In one instance, we discovered that employees liked to work late in order to complete their tasks, but could not do so because the parking lots were poorly lit and perceived as unsafe. In another instance, a high technology company had installed blackboards in the halls to encourage the informal exchange of information among scientists and engineers. The concept was good in theory, but in practice the halls were too narrow.<sup>11</sup> In both cases no metric system would improve outputs without a redesign of the workspace to enable employees to make the decisions and take the actions that they knew were necessary to achieve their metrics-based goals.

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<sup>11</sup> Personal communication from Ralph Katz of Northeastern University.

Let's return to the car door design team. Their *internal* customer might be the manufacturing division. Suppose we ask the manufacturing division to rate their satisfaction with the design team's design. In turn, we might evaluate the manufacturing division on manufacturing costs and on manufactured quality (few defects). It should not surprise us that these metrics cause manufacturing to reward simple, low-cost car door designs. Unless we balance these demands with demands to fulfil *external* customer needs, we risk misaligning the pressures on the car door team. They may eschew highly-valued styling or new features for reduced manufacturing costs.

### Step 4. Understand the Linkages

The 'House of Quality' paradigm is an effective tool to understand that linkage. The House of Quality (Hauser and Clausing, 1988) was developed as part of the quality movement. It is used by many firms to link customer needs to engineering characteristics and design decisions. We have found that it adapts nicely to the linkage of work processes.

|                 |                   | Performance Metrics |  |  |  |  |  |                                               |             |
|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|--|--|--|--|--|-----------------------------------------------|-------------|
| <u>Outcomes</u> | Customer Needs    |                     |  |  |  |  |  | Team Performance<br><br>and<br><br>Team Goals | Importances |
|                 | Revenue           |                     |  |  |  |  |  |                                               |             |
|                 | Costs             |                     |  |  |  |  |  |                                               |             |
|                 | Profit Indicators |                     |  |  |  |  |  |                                               |             |
|                 | Et cetera.        |                     |  |  |  |  |  |                                               |             |
|                 |                   | Correlations        |  |  |  |  |  |                                               |             |
|                 |                   | Priorities          |  |  |  |  |  |                                               |             |
|                 |                   | Benchmarks          |  |  |  |  |  |                                               |             |
|                 |                   | Targets             |  |  |  |  |  |                                               |             |

### Figure 2 House-of-Quality Metrics Matrix

have a direct influence on these outcomes. To help us set priorities, we list importance weights for each of the outcomes on the right-hand side of the matrix. These are usually displayed in a numerical scale, say from 0 to 100. The priority rating for customer needs comes from the Voice of the Customer Analysis; the priority rating for other outcomes from managerial goals.

We next list candidate performance metrics along the top of the matrix. These metrics are the 'knobs' that the managers and employees turn to respond to the needs and outcomes listed on the left-hand side of the matrix. The body of the matrix indicates the correlations between the metrics and the outcomes. For the metrics matrix we assign a high correlation if decisions and actions which improve the metric also improve the outcome. (If efforts affect both metrics and outcomes, then this will induce a correlation between metrics and outcomes.) We infer these correlations by understanding the work processes identified through the Voice of the Employee. This understanding allows us to select metrics which align work processes with outcome goals.

Along the right-hand side of the matrix, we also list current performance levels and team goals. Along the bottom of the matrix we list benchmarks and tentative targets. From the importance and the correlations we impute priorities for the metrics. Finally, we summarize the interrelationships (Step 3) among metrics in the 'roof' of the House. These interrelationships are particularly important if we are simultaneously setting metrics for internal customers and internal suppliers in order to highlight and avoid (or at least manage) potential conflicts.

We now have the information with which to select candidate metrics. By using the House-of-Quality Metrics matrix and by keeping the seven pitfalls in mind, management teams can propose metrics that have a good chance of aligning employee actions and decisions with the long-term needs of the firm.

Let's return to our telephone service center. One of the customer needs was 'phone menu options that are brief and fit my needs.' The firm identified metrics that were linked to this need. These metrics included: (1) the number of seconds it took for a caller to listen to all of the options, (2) the per cent of callers who used one of the standard options rather than pressing '0' or the 'all other' selection, and (3) the per cent of callers who chose the 'right' option for their need (and thus did not require a transfer). By seeking to do well on these metrics, the phone-system designers were likely to fulfil the customers' needs.

### **Step 5. Test the Correlations and Test Manager and Employee Reaction**

The best firms hire bright, creative managers and employees. No matter how carefully we design a metrics system, these managers and employees have the motives and capabilities to maximize their own well-being under the system. We hope that those decisions and actions are the decisions and actions that are in the firm's best interests, but, *a priori*, we cannot be sure. Step 5 tests the metrics system. We recommend two types of tests. Test the correlations and then test manager and employee reaction.

*Testing the correlations.* We illustrate this test with an example. The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (Draper) is an independent, but government-funded, research laboratory. Its mission is the discovery and development of new scientific and technical capabilities. They proposed a set of metrics to evaluate the selection and execution of research programs (Pien, 1997). The candidate list contained 44 metrics in the following six categories.

- ❖ Personnel capabilities

- ❖ Technical capabilities
- ❖ Strategic fit
- ❖ Project management performance
- ❖ Match to customer needs
- ❖ Financial outcomes

To test these metrics and to identify and select a reduced set of 'lean metrics,' Pien traced each program back five years to determine what value each metric would have had in 1992. He evaluated and summarized each program with a single composite score based on the complete set of metrics. He then obtained judged performance (from Draper's management) in 1997 and he compared the 1997 management evaluation to the 1992 metric score. They were highly correlated (0.934 correlation, significant at the 0.01 level) suggesting that when researchers maximized the metrics they were also maximizing outcomes. More importantly, Pien was able to identify a much smaller subset of these metrics that were easier to collect and simpler to implement, but which provided equally impressive predictive correlations.<sup>12</sup> We are currently in the process of testing Pien's methodology more widely.

*Test manager and employee reaction.* Once we establish that the metrics have high correlations, we are ready to test the system *in situ* by implementing the metrics system. We would prefer to compare the before/after reaction of a test group, which is subject to the metrics, with a control group, which is not. However, this is not always feasible.<sup>13</sup> It is important, however, that we 'instrument' the implementation. For example, in one pilot application we used a methodology, pioneered by Allen (1970, 1984), to track the work processes identified by the Voice of the Employee. Each month all managers and employees, who were subject to the new metrics system, completed short surveys in which they indicated how they allocated their time among the work processes. By tracking changes in the patterns of work processes over time we trace the impact of the metrics system. We supplement this tracking with brief surveys to determine job satisfaction, morale, commitment to the organization, attitudes, and the judged impact of the metrics system. We also track internal measures such as attrition and the outcome measures which are listed on the left side of the House-of-Quality Metrics matrix. These methodologies are still under development. However, early indications suggest that the 'instrumentation' does not require significant time from the managers and employees and that it yields valuable insight.

## **Step 6. Involve Managers and Employees**

Our philosophy has always been that those who are subject to the metrics systems should be part of the team that is responsible for developing them. 'Town meetings' and other feedback systems are extremely valuable in the implementation of any metrics system. Managers and employees want to do well for the firm — they are frustrated when they perceive that a metrics system is counterproductive. They are vocal and their recommendations are valuable. Any metrics system which is simply imposed from above without participation from those it impacts is likely to encounter resistance and even sabotage! The reps in our telephone service center example were, in

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<sup>12</sup> Pien (1997) asked a cross-section of managers to rate the importance of each candidate metric. He then chose the highest scoring metric from each category. By using step-wise regression (metrics vs outcomes) he was able to obtain a set of weights for the lean metrics. In addition, he used factor analysis to display the metrics on a two-dimensional grid. This grid provides a simple summary of program performance.

<sup>13</sup> For one before/after, test vs control design implemented in both US and Spain, see Simester *et al.* (1997).

fact, a unionized work force. Only by including some of the most senior and highly respected union members on the team was it possible to design a system that the union could accept and embrace.

Another principle of metrics comes straight from the father of the quality movement, W. Edwards Deming. Deming advocated measuring 'the system' rather than the individual. This principle was used in measuring 'call courtesy.' By having highly respected peers (an expert panel) secretly listen to and grade calls for courtesy, but by only publishing the results *as a composite* for the entire group, the phone reps were able to focus on team performance rather than worrying about being 'caught' or 'labeled' as a culprit.

We always involve managers and employees in the development of their metrics. R&D scientists will tell you when their evaluation system is forcing them to sacrifice the long-term capabilities of the firm; telephone service reps will tell you how the evaluation system is forcing them to engage in counterproductive activities; and production employees will tell you when their managers are not giving them the advice and guidance that they need. These employees are the front-line of your organization. They live with the metrics system every day and it can affect their lives in big ways. They have the knowledge. You need only listen and react.

### **Step 7. Seek New Paradigms**

Our seventh step is a caution. Use the information of Steps 1–6 creatively. Metrics enable you to get the most out of your managers, employees, and current work processes, but they should not limit you. Just as Scott Cook looked at his telephone service center and determined that his real goal was to design software that did not need support, so should you look at any metrics system and ask whether there is a new paradigm by which you can achieve your goals. Metrics need not reinforce current processes. By considering your goals creatively you can develop new processes. By focusing on the outputs (the outcomes in Figure 2) rather than the inputs (the work processes) you can identify new paradigms. Good metrics free your managers and employees to discover new, more efficient ways to accomplish *your* goals.

A final example should illustrate this. Following industry practice, one of our electric-utility clients routinely charged a hefty deposit for any new account in order to protect itself against bad credit risks and non-payment. This was sound financial practice for residential accounts. However, many of its commercial accounts were large real-estate developers, retailers, or other businesses who constantly needed to establish service on a vacant space for a short period until the space was leased to a new tenant. To the electric company, these looked like and were treated as 'new accounts.' But to the customers, who were large, reliable, well-known businesses, this was an incredible nuisance and irritant. Digging deeper we found that, if the customer called to complain, the deposit requirement was routinely waived. The firm began its analysis of this customer-articulated problem by

#### ***Seven Pitfalls that Lead to Counterproductive Metrics***

1. Delaying rewards
2. Using risky rewards
3. Making metrics hard to control
4. Losing sight of the goal
5. Choosing metrics that are precisely wrong
6. Assuming your managers and employees have no options
7. Thinking too narrowly

**Figure 3 Exhibit 1: Summary of Pitfalls**

establishing three metrics: (1) the per cent of commercial deposit requests that were waived, (2) the per cent of customers who did not pay, and (3) the monetary value of these uncollected accounts. After analyzing several months of data, the firm discovered that an astonishing 40 per cent of all commercial deposit requests were waived, that few commercial customers defaulted, and that the monetary value of uncollected accounts was small!

A team met to discuss this data. After several hours discussion about how to make the deposit collection process smoother and more palatable, one team member asked the key paradigm-shifting question: Does the protection against bad debts that we are obtaining from deposit requirements justify the ill will created among our customers? Does it even justify the administrative time it takes to process the waivers? It didn't take long to reach the obvious consensus or to alter the process. The policy was changed. A deposit is now required only if the customer is a known credit risk. As a default, the firm trusts its customers until there is evidence to the contrary — a new paradigm, and a better solution!

### **Good Metrics Empower the Organization**

Metrics empower managers and employees to make the decisions and take the actions that they believe are the best decisions and actions to achieve their metrics. If the metrics are chosen carefully, then, in the process of achieving their metrics, managers and employees will make the right decisions and take the right actions that enable the firm to maximize its long-term profit.

But choosing the right metrics system is not easy.

Metrics can have unintended and unanticipated consequences. They have unanticipated consequences simply because managers and employees are smart and creative in their efforts to succeed. The firm becomes exactly what it seeks to measure.

In this paper we summarized our experience (and the academic literature) to indicate seven pitfalls to avoid when selecting metrics (see Figure 3). If you avoid these pitfalls, you have gone a long way toward choosing effective metrics. But identifying and implementing a metrics system is hard work. You must listen to your customers and your employees, understand their work processes and interrelationships, test your metrics, enlist your managers and employees, and, above all, be creative (see Figure 4). By following these seven steps you can ensure that your metrics system is productive and that your metrics system is 'lean' and efficient.

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#### ***Seven Steps Toward Lean, Effective Metrics***

1. Start by listening to the customer
2. Understand the job
3. Understand interrelationships
4. Understand the linkages
5. Test the correlations and test manager and employee reaction
6. Involve managers and employees
7. Seek new paradigms

**Figure 4 Exhibit 2: Summary of Recommendations**

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