

# Partisans' Receptivity to Persuasive Messaging is Undiminished by Countervailing Party Leader Cues

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Accepted for publication, *Nature Human Behaviour*

## Abstract

It is widely assumed that party identification and loyalty can distort partisans' information processing, diminishing their receptivity to counter-partisan arguments and evidence. Here we empirically evaluate this assumption. We test whether American partisans' receptivity to arguments and evidence is diminished by countervailing cues from in-party leaders (Donald Trump or Joe Biden), using a large-scale survey experiment with 24 contemporary policy issues and 48 persuasive messages containing arguments and evidence. Our results are clear and unequivocal: while in-party leader cues influenced partisans' attitudes, often more strongly than the persuasive messages, we found no evidence that the cues diminished partisans' receptivity to the messages—despite them directly contradicting the messages. Rather, persuasive messages and countervailing leader cues were integrated as independent pieces of information. These results generalized across policy issues, demographic subgroups, and cue environments, and challenge existing assumptions about the extent to which party identification and loyalty distort partisans' information processing.

## Author note

For helpful feedback on an earlier version of the paper we are grateful to Daniel Williams, Alexander Agadjanian, Brian Guay, and members of the Human Cooperation Lab at MIT and the Social Psychology Seminar Series at the University of Kent. We also thank Paul Irvine for research assistance and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. BMT is co-founder of a research organization that conducts public opinion research.

## Introduction

A central question in the study of political psychology is to what extent, and under what conditions, exposure to persuasive arguments and evidence (“persuasive messages”) causes people to change their political attitudes<sup>1</sup>. In this paper we test whether American partisans’ receptivity to such persuasive messaging is diminished by countervailing cues from favored party leaders Donald Trump and Joe Biden. While cues from party leaders and other elites are ubiquitous in U.S. politics, and their effects on Americans’ opinions are well documented, there is limited evidence as to whether persuasive messages that explicitly cut against these cues retain (versus lose) their persuasive force. However, robustly answering this question is important for various reasons.

First, recent events in U.S. politics call for an answer to this question. Even months after the 2020 U.S. presidential election, large numbers of Republican voters continued to endorse former President Donald Trump’s claim that the election was “stolen” from him by illegitimate means<sup>2</sup>, despite widespread arguments and evidence to the contrary<sup>3,4</sup>. Similarly, the relative skepticism observed among Republican voters over the health risks of COVID-19 during 2020 mirrored public communications from Donald Trump and other Republican-aligned elites<sup>5-7</sup>. Such skepticism appeared unwavering through 2020 and 2021, despite scientists and medical professionals attesting to the severity of the virus, and even as the number of U.S. infections, hospitalizations and deaths reached world-topping heights. These events are of acute practical importance, and suggest that arguments and evidence fall on deaf partisan ears when pitted against countervailing cues from party leaders. However, they lack the required counterfactual outcomes to warrant this inference. For example, perhaps public opinion would have been further skewed in a party-consistent direction were it not for the arguments and evidence in public domain.

Second, consistent with these recent events in American politics and trends in public opinion, major theoretical accounts of how party leader cues influence partisans’ psychology predict that partisans’ receptivity to persuasive messaging can indeed be diminished by countervailing cues from party leaders. Specifically, exposure to such cues is theorized to activate people’s party identification and loyalty, producing an emotional reaction and (partisan) motivation to adopt the party position<sup>8</sup>. This process can be expected to diminish partisans’ receptivity to persuasive messaging, insofar as partisans either blindly conform to the leader’s position (thus ignoring the messaging), or strive to actively defend the leader’s position (thus refuting the messaging).

Third, whether or not partisans’ receptivity to persuasive messaging is diminished by countervailing cues from party leaders speaks to longstanding debates over the extent to which party leaders lead (versus follow) public opinion<sup>9,10</sup>. Specifically, if countervailing cues from party leaders diminish partisans’ receptivity to arguments and evidence, leaders plausibly possess even greater power to direct public opinion than currently thought—thus further limiting the extent to which they may be constrained by public opinion. On the other hand, if exposure to persuasive messaging largely retains its causal effect despite countervailing party leader cues, then it is possible (in principle) for arguments and evidence to counteract leaders’ influence on public opinion and facilitate constraint.

Fourth, a large body of evidence from randomized survey experiments indicates that partisans on the left and right update their political attitudes and beliefs in broadly similar ways when exposed to the same arguments and evidence<sup>11-14</sup>. Yet, there remains substantial political polarization in the standing attitudes and beliefs of the American public. What explains this discrepancy? One explanation is that, in the real world, partisans are exposed to different arguments and evidence—resulting in different attitudes and beliefs. However, another explanation is that partisans are exposed to broadly similar arguments and evidence, but the persuasive causal effect of these messages is

selectively diminished by exposure to countervailing cues from favored party leaders. The aforementioned experiments cannot adjudicate between these possibilities.

In this paper, we bring substantial new evidence to bear on each of these points. We test whether the causal effect of persuasive messaging on American partisans' attitudes is diminished by countervailing cues from party leaders Donald Trump and Joe Biden, using a large-scale pre-registered survey experiment with  $N = 4,531$  American partisans ( $N = 22,499$  observations), 24 contemporary U.S. policy issues, and 48 unique persuasive message treatments containing arguments and evidence.

Our results are clear and unequivocal. As in past work, cues from favored party leaders reliably influenced partisans' attitudes, and, in our case, typically to a greater extent than the persuasive messages. Critically, however, we found no evidence that the cues diminished partisans' receptivity to the messages—despite standing in direct contradiction to the messages. Moreover, this result generalized broadly across policy issues, demographic subgroups, and cue environments. When Trump-voting Republicans or Biden-voting Democrats were exposed to persuasive messaging about a policy issue, they responded by (1) updating their attitudes toward the message on average, and (2) updating their attitudes by a similar amount even when confronted with the fact that Trump or Biden's position, respectively, was opposed to the message. They responded this way largely irrespective of the policy issue in question, and largely irrespective of their age, gender, education, knowledge of politics, or strength of partisanship. Finally, they responded this way even in polarized, or "two-sided" cue environments; that is, even when they knew that not only was the position of their in-party leader opposed to the message, but in addition that the position of the out-party leader was aligned with the message.

We draw two main conclusions from these results. First, party loyalty and partisan motivated conformity exert a more limited effect on information processing than currently understood. It is widely held that party loyalty and the partisan motivation to conform are "activated" by party cues and can thereby exert a powerful influence over people's information processing—potentially distorting their perception, reasoning, and thus receptivity to other types of (especially counter-partisan) information.

For example, the authors of *The American Voter* famously wrote that party identity raises a partisan "perceptual screen" over information processing<sup>15</sup>, and many scholars corroborate this assessment, concluding that party loyalties "have pervasive effects on perceptions"<sup>16</sup> (p.138), altering "information processing linked to reasoning, memory, implicit evaluation, and even perception"<sup>17</sup> (p.214). An authoritative synthesis of the literature describes the prevalent view that party cues activate party identity and thus "guide reasoning"<sup>8</sup> (p.136), and a recent empirical study concludes that the influence of party identity is "so powerful" that when people receive cues from party leaders they override their ideological values<sup>18</sup> (p.39). Further consequences of the activation of party identity and the partisan motivation to conform include that people are prone to "interpret information through the lens of their party commitment"<sup>19</sup> (p.235), "rel[y] more on partisan endorsements and less on substantive arguments"<sup>20</sup> (p.57), and "often abandon their cherished values in favor of party loyalty"<sup>17</sup> (p.214). As a result, "even intellectually forceful messages [can get] distorted" by party cues<sup>21</sup> (p.852), partisans can "reject counter partisan messages, even when these messages align with their political values"<sup>22</sup> (p.1181), party cues can "interfere with partisans' ability to make decisions"<sup>23</sup>, "significantly limit the effectiveness" of exposure to other types of information<sup>24</sup> (p.5) and "reduce to nil" the persuasive impact of other relevant content<sup>25</sup> (p.811).

We find little evidence of such consequences in our data. Countervailing cues from favored party leaders did not appear to diminish partisans' receptivity to persuasive arguments and evidence whatsoever—in contrast to what one would expect if party loyalty distorted partisans' information processing. Importantly, this does not imply that party cues

(from leaders or otherwise) have no effect on people's attitudes—on the contrary, we find clear evidence that they do. Rather, the implication is that cues do not interfere with or distort partisans' processing of other (even counter-partisan) information. Notably, however, our results do not imply that directional motivated reasoning is limited in a more general sense. People have various identities and motivations beyond those derived from their party<sup>8,26</sup>, and it is possible that these were "activated" by our persuasive messaging treatments, explaining our results. We consider this question in greater detail in the discussion section.

Our second main conclusion regards the influence of party leaders on public opinion. While previous research demonstrates the power of cues from party leaders to influence partisans' attitudes<sup>9,18,27</sup>, our results indicate that leader influence stops short of providing immunity from counter-partisan persuasive messages, or even appreciably diminishing their causal effect. Yet the significance of this finding for real-world public opinion formation should not be overstated; when party leader cues are ubiquitous and reliably propped up by partisan media talking points, even if people are exposed to counter-partisan messages (which is not guaranteed) these messages may represent a tiny portion of the otherwise-partisan causal effects acting on their opinions. Furthermore, in our experiment, exposure to the party leader cues typically influenced partisans' attitudes more strongly than exposure to the persuasive messages.

Nevertheless, our results indicate that counter-partisan persuasion is possible—given exposure to persuasive messages. This suggests that at least some cases of political polarization in public attitudes and beliefs are maintained by patterns of asymmetric exposure: greater exposure to cues from favored party leaders vs. counter-partisan messages; greater exposure to pro-partisan messages vs. counter-partisan messages; or both. Thus, when faced with normatively troubling cues from party leaders, like unsubstantiated claims of election fraud, or health misinformation, our findings suggest that counter-communication strategies are not futile, and could be improved by making it harder for people to avoid counter-partisan messages—thereby forcing exposure—combined with other strategies like sanctioning the partisan media and other elites for disseminating and justifying such cues<sup>28</sup>.

In a pre-registered survey experiment conducted in September 2021, we recruited U.S. adults online who identified as either Republican or Democrat and who reported voting for Donald Trump or Joe Biden, respectively, in the 2020 presidential election ( $n = 4,531$ ; 22,499 observations). Each respondent was asked whether they agreed or disagreed with five policies, drawn randomly from a larger set of 24 contemporary American policy issues. The set of policies covered a broad array of issue areas, including immigration, the economy, healthcare, the military, foreign policy, and the criminal justice system, among others (for more details, see Methods).

On each policy question, respondents were randomized to one of four conditions in a 2x2 design. The first treatment factor was whether they received a message intended to persuade them to either support or oppose the policy {message, no message}, while the second treatment factor was whether they learned the position of their in-party leader on the policy—that is, a party leader cue {cue, no cue}. For Trump-voting Republicans, the in-party leader was Donald Trump; for Biden-voting Democrats it was Joe Biden. Importantly, the in-party leader's position was always opposed to the position argued for in the persuasive message. Thus, it was a countervailing leader cue. We selected issues for which Trump and Biden had opposing positions, based on their public statements and voting records (for more details, see Methods). The persuasive message treatments were each approximately 150 words of text, and did not mention the policy positions of any political figures or party. Instead, they entailed substantive arguments for or against the policy, appealing to the values of the intended audience, and often cited evidence, such

as statistics, in support of their argument (for more details, see Methods). Secondly, we also randomized whether respondents in the cue condition would receive cues from their in-party leader only (one-sided cues), or cues from their in-party and out-party leader (two-sided cues), thus allowing us to probe generalizability across cue environments (for more details, see Methods).


## Results

Following our pre-registered analysis protocol, we fit a multilevel linear regression model because the data are clustered by policy issue and respondent<sup>29,30</sup>. We re-code the outcome variable such that higher numbers indicate greater agreement with the in-party leader cue, allowing us to meaningfully aggregate across policy issues and partisans. Thus, the sign of the treatment effect of persuasive messaging is expected to be negative, while the sign of the treatment effect of the leader cue is expected to be positive.

Our model specification includes a parameter for each of our two treatment factors, as well as their interaction term. The parameter on the interaction term is our key quantity of interest: a positive interaction effect indicates that the average causal effect of the persuasive messaging is diminished by the presence of the countervailing leader cue. We fit the model in a Bayesian framework, and specify weakly-informative prior distributions on all model parameters (for more details, see Methods). When reporting the parameters estimated by the model, we report the median of the posterior distribution and the 95% highest posterior density interval (HPDI). The HPDI is the narrowest region that covers the value of the parameter with 95% probability, given the data and model.

The results show that, on average, partisans' receptivity to the persuasive messaging was not diminished by the countervailing party leader cues (Figure 1). First, we estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of the party leader cue (in the absence of the persuasive messaging) to be 0.47 [0.39, 0.57]; approximately half a scale point on a seven-point Likert scale, a meaningful and precisely-estimated positive effect. As expected, partisans tend to change their attitudes in the direction of cues from their in-party leader when these are learned. The estimated ATE of the persuasive messaging (in the absence of the party leader cues) is smaller in magnitude—and opposite in direction, as expected—at -0.33 [-0.42, -0.24]. On average, partisans update their attitudes toward the message when countervailing cues from in-party leaders are absent.

How, then, does the effect of the persuasive messaging change when countervailing cues from in-party leaders are present? The point estimate of the interaction effect is -0.03 [-0.13, 0.08], showing that the ATE of the persuasive messaging barely changes when countervailing cues from party leaders are present—indeed, the ATE of the persuasive messaging in the presence of countervailing party leader cues is estimated to be -0.36 [-0.45, -0.26] (Figure 1). Moreover, the upper bound of the 95% HPDI on the interaction effect is 0.08; thus, we can conclude with greater than 95% confidence that the average causal effect of the messaging does not decrease by more than one-quarter due to the countervailing cue (i.e.,  $0.08 / 0.33 \cong 0.24$ ). These results are robust across a series of alternative analyses (see Methods).




**Figure 1. Key estimates from the primary multilevel model with raw means inset.** Main panel: The top row is the average treatment effect (ATE) estimate of the party leader cue treatment (absent the persuasive message treatment). The first estimate in the second row is the ATE of the persuasive message treatment when the party leader cue is absent. The second estimate in the second row is the ATE of the persuasive message treatment when the party leader cue is present. The third row is the estimated interaction effect, which describes the change in the persuasive message ATE when the party leader cue is present (vs. absent). Error bars are 95% highest posterior density intervals (HPDI). In-set panel: Mean value of the outcome variable (agreement with in-party leader) in each condition of our experiment design. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals (CI). Estimates are based on  $n = 4,531$  respondents; 22,499 observations.

## Analyzing the distribution of attitudes

The presence of countervailing cues from their party leader did not diminish the average causal effect of persuasive messaging on partisans' attitudes. However, perhaps the countervailing cue changed other features of this causal effect that are not revealed by the average attitude change. For example, perhaps the persuasive messages caused a minority of partisans to form attitudes that explicitly disagreed with their party leader when the cue was absent, but, when the cue was present, the messaging caused a larger number of partisans to agree slightly less—but nevertheless all still agree—with their party leader. This would provide an important qualification to our results thus far.

To illuminate this question requires looking beyond the effect of the treatments on average attitudes and looking instead at their effects on the distribution of attitudes<sup>31</sup>. Thus, in Figure 2 we visualize the distribution of attitudes in each of the four conditions of our design, and we compute the difference between the distributions for those that did not receive a persuasive message versus those that did. This difference-in-distributions shows how the mass of the attitude distribution shifts in response to the persuasive messaging treatment. We compute this difference-in-distributions both for the condition in which the countervailing party leader cue is (1) absent and (2) present. We are interested in whether the difference-in-distributions differs between (1) and (2). Such a difference would indicate that the countervailing leader cue has an impact on the causal effect of the persuasive messaging that is not revealed simply by looking at average attitude change.

Figure 2 shows that this is not the case: the persuasive messages had a similar causal effect on the distribution of partisans' attitudes, whether or not there was a countervailing cue from the party leader. Specifically, exposure to persuasive messaging caused the distribution of attitudes to shift such that fewer partisans agreed or strongly agreed with the position of the in-party leader—a score of 7 or 6 on the outcome scale, respectively—and more partisans explicitly disagreed with the position of the in-party leader—a score less than 4. As Figure 2 clearly shows, this distributional shift was similar whether or not there was a countervailing cue from the in-party leader.



**Figure 2. Analyzing the effect of persuasive messaging on the distribution of attitudes.** The top two panels show the distribution of the outcome variable disaggregated by the four main conditions of our design (the distribution is shown as a within-condition proportion). The bottom two panels show the difference between the distributions for those observations that were assigned to receive a persuasive message versus those that were not. The distributions are based on  $n = 4,531$  respondents; 22,499 observations.




## Heterogeneity across policy issues?

Now we examine whether our results are heterogeneous across policy issues. Figure 3A shows the model-estimated interaction effects for each of the 24 policy issues in our design (the average interaction effect is also overlaid). Recall that positively-signed interaction effects indicate that the causal effect of the persuasive messaging is diminished by the countervailing leader cue. In short, we find no evidence of this for any of the policy issues in our design.

To further illustrate this, Figure 3B shows the corresponding conditional average treatment effects of the persuasive messaging for each policy issue, as estimated by the model. Notably, there are clear differences between policy issues in the overall causal effect of the persuasive messaging treatment; the treatment causes greater attitude change on average for some policies versus others. In contrast, however, there are only negligible differences within any given policy issue between the effect of the persuasive messaging when countervailing leader cues were present versus absent. This is shown by comparing the pairs of estimates for any given policy issue. Thus, we conclude that there is little evidence of heterogeneity in our main result across these 24 policy issues: the causal effect of persuasive messaging does not appear to be reliably diminished by countervailing leader cues for any of the issues and messages.

The minimal variation in the interaction effect across policy issues renders it difficult to “explain” this variation by reference to other potentially relevant issue-level variables—such as the baseline level of political polarization on the issues. Indeed, the only issue-level pattern we reliably observe is a negative correlation between the baseline level of polarization on an issue and the average treatment effect of the party leader cue on that issue (see Methods). In other words, being shown the party leader cue had a weaker effect on people’s attitudes for issues that were more polarized at baseline, which is consistent with prior work<sup>27,32,33</sup>. Critically, however, we do not find any evidence that baseline polarization (or any other issue-level parameter) is associated with the extent to which party cues diminished partisans’ receptivity to the persuasive messages. That is, while the simple effect of the party leader cues was larger for less polarized issues (where the cue is perhaps more surprising), the interaction between the party cues and the persuasive messaging does not reliably depend on issue polarization.



**Figure 3. Estimated (A) interaction effects and (B) conditional average treatment effects of persuasive messaging across the 24 policy issues in our design.** The overall average interaction effect and conditional average treatment effects are overlaid as vertical lines. Error bars are 95% highest posterior density intervals (HPDI). The estimates are based on  $n = 4,531$  respondents; 22,499 observations.

While a key strength of our design is the large sample of policy issues—affording generalizability—clearly, we do not exhaust the space of all possible policy issues. Moreover, the estimates for the policy issues that we do observe are not perfectly precise. This prompts the question: How much heterogeneity across policy issues could we expect to see if we had a much larger sample of policy issues and could estimate their effects with perfect precision? In other words, what is the plausible upper bound on heterogeneity across policy issues suggested by our model and data?


To answer this question, we turn to interpreting the model’s formal estimate of the variation in the estimates across policy issues. The multilevel model assumes that our estimates for each policy issue are sampled from an unobserved population of policy issues, represented as a multivariate Gaussian distribution. The model learns the parameters of that population from the data, including the variation in the estimates. To interpret these variance parameters, we use simulation. In particular, we sample one-thousand hypothetical “policy issues” from the population learned by the model, and we plot the distribution of the interaction effects (Figure 4A) and conditional average treatment effects (Figure 4B) corresponding to these policy issues. The distribution is arranged by the size of the interaction effect (for further details, see Methods).

The interpretation of the distribution is simple. Assume we were to conduct another experiment where we examined a new sample of policy issues that are similar, but not identical, to our current sample. Furthermore, assume we had infinite data and were thus able to estimate effects with perfect precision. In this new study, we would expect to observe a positive interaction effect for approximately one third of policy issues, because approximately one third of the distribution (solid vertical black line) lies above zero in Figure 4A. In other words, for one third of policies we would expect the causal effect of persuasive messaging to be diminished by countervailing leader cues. Importantly, however, in many such cases the magnitude by which countervailing leader cues are expected to diminish the causal effect of persuasive messaging is minimal. This is shown by the distribution of conditional average treatment effects in Figure 4B. Only at the very extremes of the distribution—e.g., the largest 2.5% of interaction effects, corresponding to 1 in 40 policy issues—is the countervailing leader cue expected to substantively diminish the causal effect of persuasive messaging.

We conclude from Figure 4 that, for a large majority of policy issues, it is most likely that the causal effect of persuasive messaging is not substantively diminished by countervailing cues from party leaders. However, for a small minority of policy issues, such diminishing of the causal effect may occur. We also note that the model has much uncertainty over the distribution of effects across policy issues. Future work could reduce this uncertainty by studying an even larger sample of policy issues or collecting more observations per policy issue, increasing the precision of the effects.

Relatedly, it is unlikely that the 24 policy issues in our set represent a random sample of all possible policy issues—we may be systematically missing particular types of issue, which adds some extra uncertainty to our conclusion here. For example, while our design incorporated a wide range of issues—from the politicized (e.g., undocumented immigration) to the not-so-politicized (e.g., capital gains tax)—it did not include hyper-salient and politicized issues such as abortion. Future work should test whether such issues exhibit a systematically different pattern of results, although we believe this to be unlikely given that party positions on those issues are already very well-known (and thus their addition seems unlikely to change persuasion effects). Furthermore, testing the current hypothesis on such issues may be statistically challenging, given that attitudes are likely to be more crystallized and thus persuasion effect sizes are likely to be much smaller across the board. Another consideration is that, given the source from which we sampled our policy issues (see Methods), it is plausible that our set of issues also omits

those for which there is minimal (or zero) public communication. Future work could examine the interaction between party cues and persuasive messaging in such contexts.




**Figure 4. Posterior predictive distribution of (A) interaction effects and (B) conditional average treatment effects of persuasive messaging across hypothetical policy issues.** The solid vertical lines are the expected value of the distribution. The shaded regions are 95% posterior uncertainty (quantile) intervals over the distribution. The estimates are based on  $n = 4,531$  respondents; 22,499 observations.

## Heterogeneity across respondents or cue environment?

Now we examine whether our results are heterogeneous across characteristics of our respondents (e.g., demographics) or the nature of the cue environment (one- or two-sided party leader cues). This is pertinent, because previous work suggests that the strongest effects of partisan motivated reasoning occur among the most committed and politically engaged partisans<sup>34</sup>, and that exposure to out-party (vs. in-party) leader cues can have a stronger impact on information processing<sup>35</sup>.

Figure 5 shows conditional average effects and their corresponding interaction estimates for subgroups defined by demographics and the cue environment (one-sided or two-sided cue). These estimates come from separate multilevel models, in which we examine whether the relevant demographic covariate or cue environment influence (1) the average treatment effect (ATE) of the persuasive messaging (in the absence of the countervailing leader cue) and (2) the extent to which this ATE is diminished by the presence of the countervailing leader cue (for further details, see Methods).

To summarize Figure 5, there is limited evidence of heterogeneity, even where theory suggests we should find it. For example, even among strong partisans, the causal effect of persuasive messaging was not reliably diminished by the countervailing leader cue. Furthermore, even in two-sided cue environments—where partisans knew that not only was the position of their in-party leader opposed to the message, but that the position of the out-party leader was consistent with the message—the causal effect of the message was not diminished (bottom panels in Figure 5). This last result is especially striking, given that exposure to two-sided leader cues had an overall effect on partisans' attitudes that was twice as strong as that of one-sided cues (Supplementary Figure 14).



**Figure 5. Subgroup conditional average effects and their corresponding interaction estimates.** The estimates in the right-hand panels (the interaction estimates) model the difference between the corresponding estimates in the left-hand panels. Note that the

covariates of Political Knowledge and Age are standardized in the interaction models, explaining why the estimates do not align perfectly with the conditional average effects. Note also that the conditional average treatment effects (ATEs) of the persuasive messaging (top rows in each of the left-hand panels) are those estimated in the absence of the party leader cues. Error bars are 95% highest posterior density intervals (HPDI).

## Discussion

In this paper we tested whether American partisans' receptivity to persuasive messaging was diminished by countervailing cues from favored party leaders Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Our results showed that this was not the case: the average causal effect of the persuasive messages was undiminished by the countervailing party leader cues. Moreover, this result held broadly across policy issues, demographic subgroups, and cue environments.

These findings contrast with the notion that party loyalty and a partisan motivation to conform override people's values and interfere with, distort, or otherwise limit their processing of counter-partisan messages. If such interference and distortion does occur, our findings suggest that it is relatively uncommon or may be avoided with ease.

Importantly, this does not imply that party cues (from leaders or otherwise) have minimal impact on partisans' attitude formation per se. On the contrary, in line with much previous work<sup>18,25,36–38</sup>, we found that exposure to such cues had a clear effect on partisans' attitudes—and in our particular case this effect was larger than the average effect of the persuasive messages. In this way, our results draw a clear distinction between two key research questions in political psychology: to what extent do party cues influence people's attitudes vs. by what mechanism do they exert their influence? While there is relative consensus on the first question—party cues reliably influence people's attitudes, sometimes by a great deal—the second question remains unsettled<sup>8,38</sup>. Our results advance understanding of this second question because they indicate that party leader cues do not in general affect how people process counter-partisan persuasive messages. This result is inconsistent with an influential view of party cues' mechanism which contends that they trigger powerful party loyalties that can override people's values, and interfere with, distort, or otherwise limit their processing of other types of (especially counter-partisan) information.<sup>8,17,18,21,22,24,25</sup>

However, while our results place tighter constraints on the power of party loyalty and partisan motivation specifically to interfere with and distort information processing, they do not suggest that directional motivations in general are limited. People have various identities and motivations that are not reducible to their party<sup>8,26</sup>. One interpretation of our results is that the persuasive messages influenced people's attitudes by activating directional motivations in the opposite direction to the party leader cues; and party loyalty did not (or could not) override the influence of these other directional motivations. For example, our message treatments often attempted to appeal to people's values. Insofar as values are reinforced by one's community<sup>39,40</sup>, appealing to people's values may change attitudes by triggering a directional motivation to conform. But this is just one example. Regardless of the various mechanisms one could posit for how persuasive messaging affects people's attitudes, our contribution remains unchanged: the causal effect of the mechanisms does not appear distorted by party loyalty.

The scale and design of our study provides a substantial advance in existing evidence regarding the question of whether countervailing leader cues diminish the causal effect of persuasive information. Several previous studies have randomized substantive policy information alongside exposure to party cues<sup>25,37,41–43</sup>, but their designs omitted a control group in which people received no information. Thus, the effect of exposure to counter-partisan information cannot be identified using these designs. One study<sup>44</sup> included the necessary control group, but the information treatment exerted little persuasive effect (no significant difference from the control group) when the countervailing cue was absent. Thus, the data cannot provide a clear answer to the question of whether such information loses its persuasive force when countervailing leader cues are present.



Another study<sup>36</sup> also included the necessary control group, randomizing policy information and countervailing party leader cues on two policy issues. For one issue, the information exerted a significant persuasive effect absent the countervailing cue that did not diminish in size when the countervailing cue was present. However, the key difference-in-difference (interaction) test was imprecisely estimated: the null effect could not confidently rule out the information losing greater than half its persuasive effect in the presence of the countervailing cue. Thus, the data are unable to rule out a substantial decrease in the causal effect of persuasive messaging due to countervailing cues from party leaders. Moreover, this result concerned just a single policy issue and corresponding information treatment. This constrains its generalizability, given the wide variation in the effects of party cues and political messages across policy issues in prior work<sup>27,33,45,46</sup>.

In sum, relevant previous work has used a design which either cannot answer the current research question, or is beset by the twin challenges of low statistical power and small samples of policy issues—severely limiting their ability to comprehensively answer the current research question. By contrast, our design incorporated a dramatically larger sample of policy issues, persuasive message treatments, and respondents.

Another implication of our results that warrants further discussion regards the constraint on party leaders to influence public opinion. While our results suggest that leader influence stops short of diminishing the causal effect of counter-partisan messages, a less rosy perspective on our results is that counter-partisan messages likewise fail to diminish the causal effect of party leader cues on public opinion—since the null interaction effect cuts both ways. This is the perspective adopted by a recent study<sup>36</sup> whose results are conceptually similar to ours. In considering these different perspectives, it appears that our results (and those) occupy a middle ground between the most and least normatively optimistic outcome. The most optimistic outcome is that exposure to arguments and evidence diminishes the causal effect of party leader cues, while the least optimistic is the reverse; that the latter diminishes the effect of the former. That we observe neither such outcome leaves room for the different perspectives.

Nevertheless, we contend that the least optimistic outcome is more plausible *ex ante*, owing to the relative dominance of party loyalty and partisan motivation for explaining people's political psychology and behavior<sup>8</sup>, as well as influential research that points toward the power of party loyalty and partisan motivation to override people's values, and to interfere with, distort, or otherwise limit people's processing of other types of (especially counter-partisan) information. That we find little evidence of this outcome is therefore theoretically important, even if not the most normatively optimistic.

Our results provide new evidence for the “persuasion in parallel” hypothesis<sup>11,12</sup>, which holds that most people respond to persuasive information by updating their attitudes towards the information, and by about the same amount. Our results suggest that this hypothesis holds even in contexts where people are explicitly confronted with the fact that the position of their in-party leader is opposed to that of the information. That we found this result to be largely homogenous across policy issues, demographic subgroups, and cue environments offers further support for the hypothesis. While clear evidence of heterogeneity may yet be found elsewhere, we do not find it here.

Now we consider some limitations of our study. The main limitation concerns the generalizability of our results to other contexts. A growing body of evidence shows that persuasion phenomena can be highly variable across contexts<sup>1,45,47,48</sup>. Notably, while we included an unusually large and diverse sample of policy issues and persuasive message treatments in our design, each issue had only two corresponding message treatments (one that contradicted the Biden cue and one that contradicted the Trump cue). Meanwhile the “space” of potential messages that we could have included is extremely

large given the numerous dimensions along which persuasive messages can vary<sup>45</sup>. It is possible that different types of messages would produce different results than ours.

Another potentially relevant dimension for generalizability concerns the party leader cue treatment. In line with previous work, our treatment consisted in simply communicating the position of the party leaders on the policy issue in question. However, in the real world of political communication, typically party leaders (and their supporters in the partisan media) do not simply announce their positions to the electorate, but rather spend a great deal of time and energy providing justifications for those positions, as well as arguments and evidence against alternative positions. The presence of such justifications may enable partisans to more easily ignore counter-partisan messages and simply fall into line with their party leader—as they are better able to rationalize this action<sup>49</sup>. To systematically test this proposition would involve adding a further treatment factor to our design: randomizing whether partisans receive a message supportive of their party leader. We consider this extension of our design a priority for future research.

To conclude, we reiterate our primary result: American partisans' receptivity to persuasive messaging was not diminished by countervailing cues from party leaders. This result generalized broadly across policy issues, demographic subgroups, and cue environments. Future work should further test the boundaries of this phenomenon.

## Methods

The hypothesis, sample size, experiment design, and analysis plan were pre-registered on September 1<sup>st</sup>, 2021, prior to data collection, at <https://osf.io/9gnaj>. Respondents provided informed consent and the survey was deemed exempt from requiring ethics approval by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (ID: E-2285). Supplementary Information for this paper is available online at <https://osf.io/v3s72/>.

## Experiment design

Respondents began the survey by providing informed consent and answering an attention check question that they were required to pass in order to continue with the survey (they were given one opportunity to pass this question, see Supplementary Information 1). Following that, respondents answered a series of pre-treatment questions to measure their demographic and other characteristics, starting with their U.S. party identification. Those classified as true Independents were not eligible to continue with the survey (for the classification scheme and other covariates, see Supplementary Information 1).

Respondents then arrived at the policy questions. Each policy question appeared on its own survey page and respondents' attitudes were measured on a seven-point Likert scale running from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). On each policy question, respondents were randomized to one of the four treatment conditions with equal probability; that is, randomization occurred at the policy-question level, and was independent across policy questions. The party leader cue treatment (where assigned) always appeared before the persuasive message treatment (where assigned) on the survey page. As noted in the main text, for additional generalizability, we also randomized the specific nature of the party leader cue treatment. Prior to seeing any policy questions, respondents were randomized with equal probability to one of two "cue type" conditions, determining whether they saw a "one-sided" leader cue or a "two-sided" leader cue on policy questions where they were assigned to receive a party leader cue. Respondents assigned to the one-sided cue type condition saw cues from their in-party leader only, whereas respondents assigned to the two-sided cue type condition saw cues from their in-

party and out-party leader. The two leaders disagreed on all of the policies in our set (if Trump supports, Biden opposes; and vice versa).

### **Policy issues and treatments**

The policy issues and corresponding positions (cues) of Donald Trump and Joe Biden were sourced from the website <https://www.isidewith.com>, an online encyclopedia that documents the real positions of U.S. political figures on a range of contemporary American policy issues. The party leader cue treatment consisted in informing respondents whether Trump and/or Biden agreed or disagreed with the policy in question, alongside a thumbnail picture of the leader's face. Supplementary Information 2 provides further details regarding the set of policy issues and the party leader cue treatments.

For each policy issue, we developed two persuasive message treatments that were each approximately 150 words in length; one that contradicted Trump's position on the policy, and one that contradicted Biden's position. Supplementary Information 2 reports the persuasive message treatments in full and provides additional details; however, an example treatment is shown below for the policy, "Allow the military to use enhanced interrogation techniques, such as waterboarding, to gain information from suspected terrorists." The message treatment is that which would have been shown to Republican respondents, since the Trump cue supported the policy:

*Evidence shows that enhanced interrogation techniques are simply not effective. Therefore, they should not be allowed. In 2014, the US Senate published a 525-page report into the CIAs enhanced interrogation program. It found that enhanced interrogation techniques did not produce reliable intelligence, nor gain cooperation from suspects. It also found the CIAs justification for using the techniques relied on bad evidence. For example, information that led to Osama bin Laden was reportedly obtained through standard techniques, and suspects who were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques in fact tried to provide false and misleading information about bin Laden's whereabouts. Ultimately, while such techniques may occasionally provide useful information, evidence suggests this is rarely the case. The question then becomes: is it worth violating international law by torturing people—who are effectively innocent until proven guilty by a jury—for mainly useless information? The answer is No. America is better than that.*

### **Sample**

We contracted with the survey provider Lucid to recruit 5000 U.S. adults quota matched to the national distributions of age, gender, education and region. The survey was fielded September 2–13, 2021. A total of 7,483 respondents began the survey, and a total of 5,071 respondents completed it—corresponding to 25,181 observations. Supplementary Information 3.1 provides information about sample demographics and Supplementary Figure 4 (in Supplementary Information 3.4) shows the points of attrition during the survey. No statistical methods were used to predetermine our sample size but our sample size is substantially larger than that reported in previous relevant publications.<sup>36,44</sup>

### **Analytic strategy**

Following our pre-registered protocol, our analysis restricts to respondents who (1) identified as Republicans or Democrats (including Independents who "lean" to one of the parties) and (2) reported voting for Donald Trump or Joe Biden, respectively, in the 2020

U.S. presidential election ( $n = 4,531$ ; 22,499 observations). For those who did not vote in 2020, we use their stated preference for Trump or Biden. This restriction is designed to maximize the influence of the party leader cue by excluding pure Independents and a small minority of Republicans (Democrats) who preferred Biden (Trump) in 2020. Data collection and analysis were not performed blind to the conditions of the experiment.

As described in the main text, we analyzed the data using Bayesian multilevel linear regression models. All multilevel models in this paper are fitted using the R package *brms*.<sup>50</sup> The multilevel model offers us two advantages over, for example, OLS with clustered standard errors, because it provides a principled framework for examining heterogeneity in our results across policy issues.

First, as well as estimating average effects aggregated across all 24 policy issues in our design, we also sought to estimate the effects at the level of each individual policy issue. The multilevel model allows us to do so while avoiding overfitting the data. The intuition here is simple: because our design contains many different policy issues, even though we have a large number of observations overall there is still a relatively small number of observations with which to estimate effects at the level of each individual policy issue. Thus, estimating these effects using just the raw data for each policy issue would produce some estimates that are large (or small) simply due to sampling variability. Such estimates would not generalize well to a new data set; they are overfit. The multilevel model addresses this problem by adaptively “shrinking” the individual estimates toward the mean estimate, thereby reducing overfitting and improving the out-of-sample accuracy of the individual estimates on average (e.g., see Chapter 13 in <sup>30</sup>). Another way of stating this benefit of multilevel modeling is that we are less likely to fall victim to increased type I error rates that result from the multiple “comparisons” involved in examining our effects across each of 24 policy issues.<sup>51</sup>

Second, the multilevel model allows us to formally estimate the heterogeneity in our effects across policy issues. The intuition here is again simple: our design contains a sample of policy issues, but really we’d like to understand the heterogeneity in effects across the wider population of policy issues from which our sample is drawn. The multilevel model explicitly estimates the parameters of this population, given our data and some assumptions, thereby providing insight into the expected heterogeneity in effects across the wider population of policy issues (e.g., see Chapter 13 in <sup>30</sup>).

**Primary multilevel model.** Our primary multilevel model specification includes a parameter for each of our two treatment factors, as well as their interaction term, and the model allows these parameters (and the intercept) to vary across policy issues as well as across respondents. The formal specification and diagnostics of this primary model are reported in full in Supplementary Information 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. The primary model forms the basis of the results that are reported in the results sections prior to the section in which we examine heterogeneity across respondents and cue environment. Our primary results (shown in Figure 1) passed a series of robustness checks.

First, there were small amounts of post-treatment differential missingness across conditions in the outcome variable (Supplementary Information 3.3 and 3.4 report balance checks and analyses of missing data, respectively). Thus, we conducted a “worst-case” imputation analysis as a robustness check: we imputed values for the post-treatment missing outcomes that would work maximally in favor of us finding a positive interaction effect, and we refitted the multilevel model including the observations with these imputed values. This analysis provides an estimate of the interaction effect that assumes the worst case of bias caused by the differential missingness. However, the pattern of results from this analysis was substantively identical to those of our primary model (i.e., a precise null interaction effect, see Supplementary Information 4.3.2).

Second, recall that respondents answered five policy questions in our design, and randomization was independent across questions. A potential concern could be that, after being exposed to the treatments on the first or earlier questions, respondents answered systematically differently on the remaining questions. To confirm this was not the case, we subsetted the data by policy question order {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and refitted the multilevel model to each subset. The results were substantively identical across the order of policy questions (Supplementary Information 4.3.1).

Third, in Supplementary Information 3.2 we show that we get the same key results from simple OLS regression.

Finally, while concerns have recently been raised about the inattentiveness of survey respondents recruited via Lucid,<sup>52</sup> we consider it highly unlikely that inattentiveness can explain our pattern of results here. First, we note that, of the 7,483 respondents who started the survey, 1,145 (~15%) failed an initial attention check and were not eligible to continue with the survey. This suggests that our attention check was working to filter out a substantial portion of inattentive responders. Second, we observed clear and precisely-estimated main effects of both the party leader cues and persuasive messaging treatments—yet no interaction effect (as per our key results). It is unclear how inattention could cause both the main effects to be clearly and precisely estimated, yet their interaction to be a precise null effect. Third, our results hold across levels of educational attainment and performance on a political knowledge quiz (see Figure 5), covariates which have been found to be correlated with attentiveness in other research. For these reasons, we consider it highly unlikely that inattention explains our pattern of results.

**Heterogeneity across policy issues.** In addition to estimating the variation across policy issues in our parameters of interest (i.e., the interaction effect), our primary multilevel model also estimates the correlations between the parameters across policy issues. We examined these correlation estimates to determine whether any of our parameters were reliably associated across policy issues. The only reliable correlation was a negative correlation between the intercept parameter and the parameter on the party leader cue treatment indicator:  $r = -.61 [-.89, -.15]$  (see Supplementary Table 5). Given that the intercept indicates the degree of alignment with the in-party cue in the control group (i.e., at baseline) collapsed across partisans, this correlation implies that policy issues with weaker levels of baseline political polarization tended to exhibit larger effects of the party leader cue. This is consistent with prior work<sup>27,32,33</sup>, but tangential to our main results here (neither the average treatment effect of the messages nor the interaction term were reliably associated with any parameters across policy issues; Supplementary Table 5).

To generate the distribution in Figure 4, we sampled the estimates of one-thousand hypothetical “new” policy issues from the posterior distribution of our fitted primary multilevel model (i.e., a posterior predictive distribution). Thus, for each sampled “policy issue” we obtained four parameters: an intercept, two treatment effects (one for the persuasive message effect, one for the party leader cue effect), and the interaction effect. For each policy issue, the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) of the persuasive message in the absence of the countervailing leader cue is simply equal to the sampled value of the treatment effect of the persuasive message; by contrast, the CATE of the persuasive message in the presence of the countervailing leader cue is equal to the sum of (1) the sampled value of the treatment effect of the persuasive message and (2) the sampled value of the interaction effect. We ranked the distribution of interaction effects and CATEs across policy issues by order of size, running from the largest to smallest interaction effect (recall that positively signed interaction effects indicate that the causal effect of the persuasive messaging is diminished by the countervailing party leader cue).

Finally, because our model is Bayesian, we performed the above process for each MCMC draw from the posterior distribution of the model and, for each rank-ordered policy issue (one through one-thousand), computed the mean and 95% quantiles across the draws. In Figure 4, the mean corresponds to the vertical solid dark lines and the 95% quantiles are the shaded regions. A more detailed description of this simulation is provided in Supplementary Information 5.

**Heterogeneity across respondents and cue environment.** For the results reported in this section, we fitted additional multilevel models corresponding to each respondent-level covariate examined, as well as the cue-type treatment factor. The formal specifications and diagnostics of these models are reported in full in Supplementary Information 6. In Supplementary Information 6.3, we reproduce Figure 5 in the main text but additionally show the estimates of the party leader cue effect from the different subgroup models.

## Data availability statement

The data set generated and analyzed during the current study is available in the Open Science Framework repository, <https://osf.io/v3s72/>.

## Code availability statement

The code used to analyze the data during the current study is available in the Open Science Framework repository, <https://osf.io/v3s72/>.

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