

July 2020

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MIT

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ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Assistant Professor, MIT Sloan School of Management Applied Economics	July 2020 -
Assistant Professor, Columbia Business School Economics Division	January 2015 – June 2020
Fellow, INSEAD Economics and Political Science Area	April 2014 – December 2014
Fellow, Harvard University Department of Economics	September 2011 – July 2014

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics, Toulouse School of Economics	2012
M.Sc. Economics, London School of Economics	2007
B.Sc. Economics, Queen Mary, University of London	2006

RESEARCH

Org. Econ., Political Economy, I.O., Theory

GRANTS & AWARDS

Robert F. Lanzillotti Prize for Best Paper in Antitrust Economics	2011
CASBS Summer Fellow (Stanford)	2018
Dean's Award for Teaching Excellence in an Elective Course	2019

TEACHING

Columbia	
Economics of Strategic Behavior (MBA & EMBA):	2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019
Organizational Economics (PhD):	2016, 2017, 2018
Industrial Organization (PhD, guest instructor):	2019
INSEAD	
Organizational Economics (PhD):	2014

ACADEMIC VISITS

Toulouse School of Economics:	May - June 2018
NYU Stern:	April - May 2019
London School of Economics (STICERD):	May - June 2019

SEMINARS & WORKSHOPS

Columbia weekly IO/Org Econ seminar	2015 - 2020
Columbia monthly Strategy seminar	2015 - 2020
Junior Faculty Org Econ Workshop	local organizer in 2018
Disinformation Online Conference	co-organizer in 2018

PRESENTATIONS

2014: Chicago Booth, Paris Dauphine, Ecole Polytechnique, Yale SOM, Bocconi, Kellogg MEDS, WUSTL, HBS, Exeter, Rochester, Columbia, Insead, HEC Paris, Oxford, CUNEF,
2015: IIOC, Queen's Org Econ Workshop, QPEC, Petralia Workshop
2016: QPEC, Petralia Workshop, Utah WBEC (discussant), FTC Micro Conference (discussant), SICS Conference (Berkeley)
2017: NYU Pol Sci, SIOE, Cattolica, Galatina Summer Workshop, QPEC, Insead
2018: Kellogg Strategy, MIT Sloan, Johns Hopkins, Mannheim, Frankfurt, Columbia Political Science, Toulouse, Paris School of Economics, NYU Paris, Galatina Summer Workshop, QPEC, Junior Faculty Org Econ Workshop, Economic History Association (discussant), NBER Org Econ
2019: FCC, CASBS (Stanford), London School of Economics, London Business School, NBER Org Econ (discussant), Imperial College, Exeter, 4th Summer Workshop in Political Economy (EIEF), Université Laval, Rational Inattention and Political Economy workshop at UCSD, ESSO/ENT/IMO at the LSE (discussant)
2020: CSEF Naples, Utah Winter Organizational and Political Economics Conference (discussant), Columbia Political Science, MIT Sloan, NYC Media Seminar

REFEREEING

Econometrica, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, AER Insights, AEJ: Micro, AEJ: Policy, Rand Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Journal, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Management Science, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Theory and Decision, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Review of Industrial Organization, Comparative Political Studies

WORKING PAPERS

“How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments: From the Norman Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act” (with Simone Meraglia and Nico Voigtlaender), NBER Working Paper No. 23606

We study the emergence of urban self-governance during the Commercial Revolution in the 12th-14th century and show that municipal autonomy shaped national institutions over the subsequent centuries. We focus on England after the Norman Conquest of 1066 and build a novel comprehensive dataset of 554 Medieval towns (boroughs). We show that merchant towns were particularly likely to obtain Medieval Farm Grants – the right of self-governed tax collection and law enforcement. We present evidence that Farm Grants, in turn, were stepping stones for towns’ direct representation in the English Parliament. We also show that self-governed towns strengthened the role of Parliament: They resisted royal attempts to introduce patronage and maintained broader voting rights; they also raised troops to back Parliament against the king during the Civil War in 1642, and they supported the modernization of Parliament during the Great Reform Act of 1832. Finally, we compare England’s institutional path to Continental Europe and discuss the conditions under which urban self-governance fosters institutional development at a higher level.

“Media Competition and News Diets” (with Julia Cagé and Michael Sinkinson)

News media operate in two-sided markets, offering bundles of content to readers as well as selling readers' attention to advertisers. Technological innovations in content delivery, such as the advent of broadcast television or of the Internet, affect both sides of the market, threatening the basic economic model of news operations. We examine how the entry of television affected local newspapers as well as consumer media diets in the United States. We develop a model of print news and show that entry of national television news could adversely affect the provision of local news. We construct a novel dataset of U.S. newspapers' economic performance and product characteristics from 1944 to 1964. Our empirical strategy exploits quasi-random variation in the timing of the entry of television in different markets. We show that the entry of television was a negative shock for newspapers, particularly evening newspapers, in both the readership and advertising markets. Further, we find a drop in the total quantity of news printed, in particular original reporting, raising concerns about the provision of local news.

“Petty Corruption and Citizen Reports” (with Antonio Russo), Preparing Resubmission to *International Economic Review*

Offering incentive schemes to low-ranking officials is difficult in corrupt environments. As is well known, there exists a tension between the dual goals of enforcing regulations and preventing corruption. Recent efforts to curb abuses have inspired interest in using new communication technologies to collect information directly from citizens. In our model, entrepreneurs must comply with regulations before undertaking a risky activity. Officials verify their compliance and may engage in corruption. The government tolerates corruption and weak enforcement when it does not communicate directly with entrepreneurs. We show that a simple self-reporting scheme in which entrepreneurs can report their own noncompliance to the government is optimal, and both deters corruption and improves regulatory enforcement.

“Motivating Agents to Acquire Information”

I investigate the optimal way of organizing and motivating the production of information by a team of agents. I compare two modes of production. In the "team outputs" setting, agents produce public information jointly and their individual contributions are indistinguishable. In the "individual outputs" setting, each agent produces her own public information. Directing agents to produce information jointly is commonly observed. Yet, agency theory stresses the difficulties associated with providing incentives based on team outputs and emphasizes the superiority of individual performance measures. This paper provides one reason why the joint production of information is common in practice, which does not rely on ad hoc technological advantages.

“Self-Reporting Schemes and Corporate Crime” (with Martijn Han)

We study the design of self-reporting schemes for corporate crimes. We model a welfare-maximizing authority and a continuum of firms, where each firm has one employer and one employee. Employees decide whether to take an action beneficial to themselves but harmful to their employer and society. Employers design contracts that either prevent the harmful act or tolerate it. We investigate the optimal corporate and individual sanctions to impose on firms whose employees confess to having committed the harmful act. In an extension, we let employers monitor their employees, and investigate the optimal sanctions when employers report their own employees.

PUBLICATIONS

“Newspapers in Times of Low Advertising Revenues” (with Julia Cagé), *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, Vol. 11, No. 3, August 2019 (pp. 319-64)

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Measuring Voters’ Knowledge of Political News” (with Andrea Prat)

“From Towns’ Self-Governance to National Assemblies: A Theoretical Analysis” (with Simone Meraglia and Nico Voigtlaender)

OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES

None