Accounting Group: Selected Doctoral Theses

TITLE:  
COMMITTEE:  
Rodrigo S. Verdi (co-chair), Eric So (co-chair), Andrew G. Sutherland  
ABSTRACT:  
I investigate the effect of corporate patent disclosures on innovation. Using the American Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA) as a plausibly exogenous shock to corporate patent disclosures, I find evidence of the AIPA shaping innovation through two simultaneous channels. First, the AIPA encourages a firm to innovate by facilitating access to the scientific information contained in other firms’ patent disclosures. Second, the AIPA discourages a firm from innovating by increasing the risk of leaking business-related strategies through its own patent disclosures. These findings are consistent with the view that corporate patents contain information useful for both science and business, and highlight their respective roles in generating both spillover benefits and proprietary costs of mandating patent disclosures. Finally, using textual analysis, I find that firms with high proprietary costs respond to the AIPA by strategically changing their patent disclosures to obfuscate exploitable business-related signals.

TITLE:  
"Do Journalists Help Investors Analyze Firms' Earnings News?” – Nicholas Guest (2018)  
COMMITTEE:  
S.P. Kothari (co-chair), Eric So (co-chair), John Core, Rodrigo Verdi  
ABSTRACT:  
I examine whether the market’s reaction to firms’ earnings news varies with analysis (or editorial content) produced by financial journalists. A series of natural experiments at The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) suggests that WSJ articles increase trading volume and improve price discovery at S&P 500 earnings announcements. The effects are stronger when an article contains more original analysis and less content reproduced from the firm’s press release. This evidence refines inferences from prior studies that find media dissemination, but not analysis, makes the market’s earnings response more efficient. Instead, my paper suggests media analysis also enhances investors’ trading decisions by improving their understanding of earnings news, albeit for a limited set of large firms. In other words, journalists’ analysis efforts provide value to readers, which helps explain the continued production of costly earnings-related analysis amid increasing pressure from low-cost information sources.

TITLE:  
"Are Long-Term Earnings Targets Forecasts?” – Heidi Packard (2018)  
COMMITTEE:  
John Core (chair), Joseph Weber, Rodrigo Verdi  
ABSTRACT:  
This paper examines whether earnings targets used in long-term performance-based compensation plans predict future performance. Using a sample of targets from long-term grants made to CEOs from 2007 to 2012, I find that earnings targets provide information about future earnings outcomes; however, analysts do not respond to the information targets provide at the time of disclosure. Rather, I find analysts primarily adjust their expectations in the year of the performance period. The information value of targets is robust to variation in cross-sectional factors such as monitoring and financial reporting concerns, and concentrated in cases where agency conflicts are low and traditional management forecasts are not available. To my knowledge, this analysis is the first to document a forecasting role for the long-term targets used in earnings-based compensation plans.
ABSTRACT: I study the effects of CEOs' unrealized capital gains tax liabilities (tax burdens) on corporate risk-taking. Recent work suggests that high tax burdens discourage CEOs from selling stock. I hypothesize that this causes the executives to become overexposed to firm-specific risk thereby reducing their willingness to make risky corporate decisions. In a series of tests, I find that corporate risk-taking decreases as CEOs' personal tax burdens increase. Further, firms with CEOs who are more locked-in to their stock positions (i.e., CEOs with higher tax burdens) experience larger increases in risk-taking following federal and state tax cuts. When I investigate the mechanism behind this relation, I find that tax cuts trigger stock sales by the locked-in executives, allowing for improved diversification. Overall, my findings indicate that the personal tax burdens of CEOs affect the firm by reducing executives' preferences for risk at the corporate level.